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Evolution of European policies towards Maghreb Countries ⁽¹⁾

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ABSTRACT

The paper aims to identify the policies that were adopted by the EU towards the Arab Maghreb countries before and after the Arab Spring revolutions for a specified time. An Examination of the rising profile of the EU in the Southern African Maghreb countries. The paper tries to investigate the truth of its (EU) intervention whether having a promoted or undermining track towards these countries. Elaborating on the issues of migration, terrorism, energy, and democracy will be illustrated. The paper will deduce the reasons for the difference before and after. These differences will be analyzed in a scrutiny way due to the reasons for change where present. In this regard, some reasons originated from the Maghreb countries themselves and others are from Brussels. Upon that, a kind of progress trajectory will be illustrated.

Keywords: Maghreb- Policies- EU- Energy- Terrorism - Democracy- Tunisia- Algeria- Morocco – Middle East- Arab spring revolutions.

المستخلص

تهدف الورقة بصورة أساسية إلى التعرف على السياسات التي يمارسها الاتحاد الأوروبي تجاه دول المغرب العربي قبل وبعد ثورات الربيع العربي لفترة زمنية محددة. من خلال هذه الورقة البحثية، سوف يتضح كيفية تدخل الاتحاد الأوروبي في هذه البلدان، وهل يعد تدخل الاتحاد الأوروبي سلبياً أو إيجابياً من خلال طرح قضايا الهجرة والإرهاب، والطاقة، والديمقراطية لبلدان المغرب العربي محل الدراسة قبل وبعد الثورات. المقارنات المستنتجة سوف يتم تحليلها بطريقة تمحيصية، ومعرفة أسباب الاختلاف. في هذا الصدد وكما سيتضح لاحقاً أن تلك الاختلافات بعضها قد نشأ من البلدان المغاربية نفسها والبعض الآخر من بروكسل.

الكلمات الدالة: المغرب- الاتحاد الأوروبي- السياسات - الطاقة- السياحة- الديمقراطية- تونس- الجزائر - المغرب- الشرق الأوسط - ثورات الربيع العربي

INTRODUCTION

The EU is one of the effective world players in exercising different powers, and its power can exist in different forms. EU believes in special political actors that facilitate dealing with international phenomena. Accordingly, it is engaged in different north Mediterranean countries' aspects, i.e., the Maghreb countries.

This paper deals with different issues, in which the EU and the Maghreb countries are interested. The particular Maghreb countries, which the author is concerned with, are Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. The author did choose these three countries as representatives for Maghreb countries, because they all commonly had a prolonged colonial history, although, they almost obtained their independence at the same dates during the 50s and 60s. In the meantime, the same type of autocratic regimes were exercised upon them.

They were also, during the last two decades, fighting Islamist terrorism, which was jeopardizing their security. Last but not least, after the collapse of Bin Ali in Tunisia occurred, Algeria and Morocco were trying to enhance their overall economic and political conditions, because they were suspecting an upcoming period of chaos and instability. Taking into account, what had occurred in Tripoli might take place in Algiers and Rabat (Layachi, 2011) as well. Morocco had witnessed some protests on the current situation of the country without being evolved into a real revolution. The Moroccan king Mohammed responded to some of the demands, which represents the necessity of amending the constitution, limiting the king's powers, and moving towards strengthening the role of the elected government in the country.

Same situation for Algeria, which has tried in conjunction with the political movement in the region to direct its wealth and economic potential towards staving off any political unrest. The country witnessed very limited protests, which are not comparable to their counterparts in the rest of the regions, even under its poor health situation, (Abdel Aleem, 2016). In this regard, Different aspects and issues should be addressed through the sub-region (Security issues, terrorism, energy, and illegal migration).

Catherine Ashton has praised different positive reactions of some partners in the region for practicing and executing activities of cooperation

and integration between the EU and the Mediterranean, especially with Maghreb countries in order to accelerate the developments in the region. These developments will be highly beneficial, not only to the Maghreb countries but also to the EU as well. Also, it was highly confessed by Gunther Oettinger, the Commissioner for Energy, that Energy is playing an important role in the region's development (Fuel, 2013). This gives us a claw of the pretext of the EU to intervene in the region.

STUDY SUBJECT

The study seeks to identify the essence of EU policy and the extent of its efficacy impact on the Maghreb countries after their revolutions. Also, reviewing the trends of the EU policies towards the three Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria) before and after the revolution. The study will reveal the causes of change before and after if present. Accordingly, if there is a noticeable change, ways will be put forward to bridge the gap of the change.

RESEARCH PROBLEMS

The research problem rotates around the coming questions.

- Has the EU Policy changed towards the Maghreb Countries before and after the Arab Revolutions?

This includes many sub-questions as follows:

- 1- If the policy has changed, is it relatively more effective? or ineffective than before? And what are the reasons for the change or the stability?
- 2- Are there any good coupes from the EU's side?

To answer the research questions, the researcher relied on the framework provided by the theoretical framework from the "Collective Action Problem" theory, developed first in the mid-1960s by Mancur Olson Mancurson. (Olson, 1965), and developed later by European integration students.

The Collective Action Problem theory addresses an important issue: why do members of an organization not agree on the collective interest of this organization to optimize the achievement of the goals? Although Olson had written this theory before the adoption of the Eu's common foreign and security policy, it provides a typical example of the difficulties which he described in his book. In this regard, Olson has monitored several factors that may explain the lack of the agreement, these are the most important factors:

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- Although members of the Organization are involved in a common goal or common objectives, different interests go along with the same path, such as special relations with external forces, special regional interests, competition for economic gains, or internal political obstacles.
- Members of the organization or group expected that the desired collective action goal would in any way be achieved even without their contributions. Based on this belief, these members will be less inclined to make an adequate effort, referring to the phenomenon of "free-riding", a familiar feature of EU foreign policy. This phenomenon is limited not only to the small Member States but also to the major Powers.
- The phenomenon of "free-riding" relates to the participation of Member States in the discussions on important international and regional developments, but the communities they represent are often unwilling to bear the costs and risks of taking a specific position.
- The larger the organization and the asymmetry among its members, the less opportunities to pursue common interests.
- Members' States tend to attribute negative messages of human rights violations or inadequate law enforcement to the European Union. Thus, protecting their bilateral relations from difficult issues. This not only negatively affects the Union's relationship with the developing world but also weakens the value of the agenda. In this context, their concerns may arise about the lack of credibility of one of the parties (the European Union and member states).

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The main objective of the paper is to study and analyze the change of the EU policies towards North African countries before and after the revolutions, and the most important aim is to find methods for Europe to enhance its performance and upgrade its policies.

METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The author will give a platform for the addressed issues in the forms of before and after the uprisings, with some comparative contribution to quest whether the EU intervention after 2011 is effective and having further improvements or not. As the time range of the paper is briefly from the 90s till 2011 then after 2011 till 2015. The start is from the mid of 90s when Maghreb Union came into effect and the member states announced plans for

the customs union by 1995. (McKeon Jr. W, 1992). In addition to the presence of first detriment (5+5) initiative dialogue that shaped the relationship between the EU and the south of the Mediterranean. (Nunez, 2012).

And the historical time ended in 2015 because, in Tunisia, the transitional phase began with the escape of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and then the appointment of Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi as interim president in January 2011, who continued until 2015. Afterward, the election of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People and the President of the Republic and the formation of the government in February 2015 occurred. Both Maghreb and Algeria are sequentially affiliated to Tunisia's chaos. (Salama, 2016).

The student draws her sources from primary and secondary sources.

- The primary sources are mainly European Commission documents - European Foreign Affairs Documents - Documents of European Delegations of the Three Countries concerned with revolutions - documents from individual countries concerned.
- Secondary sources are office and electronic sources, such as specialized European books and periodicals, and official websites.

The comparison tool will be used to highlight the similarities and differences between the foreign policies of the European Union before and after the revolutions of the Arabian Countries. As it is used, as well, to analyze the course of transitions and changes in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia Similarly, the method of qualitative content analysis will be used to read European documents.

DIVISION OF THE STUDY

The research is divided into four topics:

The first one is the literature review, while the second topic is dealing with threading some of the EU's detriments and the third Topic will expose how does EU interrelate with Morocco (migration issue), Algeria (energy), and Tunisia (democracy and migration) with the concerned issue of each briefly from the 90s till 2011 then after 2011 till 2014. Moreover, each part will contribute with a small paragraph of comparative analysis, and finally, the fourth topic is the conclusion.

INTRODUCTION

The Middle East has a very important strategic position for the European Union, particularly in North African countries, where the geographical proximity and economic interests of the EU countries are in this vital region. They have an important geostrategic position, in the middle of the three continents of the world, on international waterways, which play a major role in the global economy, and have important energy resources such as oil and natural gas. At the same time, the Middle East and North Africa region poses a serious security challenge to the EU countries due to the region's political instability and mass migration. (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2014)

Relations with the third world are often subject to both positive and negative economic and political conditions. EU relies on a conditionality policy while dealing with southern countries. The conditionality of European assistance to the neighboring countries and opportunities to participate in joint ventures or access to the single market. (نوفل سعيد، 2016، ص19). Positive conditionality refers to promising incentives and benefits such as agreement if the third state meets certain political or economic conditions while Negative policing means reducing, satisfying or terminating certain benefits if conditions are violated. (ElBadry Shereen, 2016). Under the "More for More" policy introduced in 2011, the European Endowment for Democracy was established to encourage bottom-up initiatives for democratic reforms in the southern Mediterranean. (Hatab Shaimaa, 2019, P.8).

FIRST TOPIC: LITERATURE REVIEW

First of All, the researcher represents a growing concern in this paper according to the conflict of interests between EU nation's states. Vohra (2020) declared that reshaping developments on the ground in North Africa, after the Arab spring revolutions, by the EU was an important target. They concentrated on security and migration but unfortunately failed to accomplish it. As in the case of Libya, the effectiveness of the EU was obvious through its failure in managing the fallout in Libya and converting it into a more stabilized country. Reasons for failure were mainly back due to different reactions of member states, for instance, both Germany and Italy reportedly sold arms to choke parties in the Libyan conflict with no political results,

while France's situation was different, since it depends on strong man Haftar to keep immigrants and extremists to prevent them from reaching Europe.

In the same approach and although the European Union works to transfer the powers of nation-states to European institutions, it is a non-federal entity. Despite the participation of its members in common policies, many obstacles prevent full cooperation or coordination between the member states and the European Union in many fields. This was concluded by Amani Suleiman (2015), who tried to explain it. Voting trends within the European Parliament tend to favor the national interest over the common European interest. Also, some members of Parliament tend to party and ideological blocs and put them ahead of European interests; which makes the parliament vote more often than not tend to make decisions in national or ideological interests, rather than common European interests.

It would be clearer that, other factors explain the conflict of interests within the European Union, foremost among which are the regional groupings; Some European countries have formed small subsidiary federations to serve their interests, as they see that the bond between them is stronger than that of the rest of the Union countries. One of the most prominent examples of this is the Benelux Union, which brings together Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and has been based on a cooperation agreement since 1955. Some believe that these gatherings are working to raise the ethnic or linguistic spirit of some people in the European Union; this reduces the chances of integration into the unitary European project. Another factor is the conflict of interests within the European Union related to separatist and nationalist movements within European countries, which makes the dream of European unity vulnerable to shrinkage considering doubts about the unity of a single European country, and the possibility of the collapse of some nation-states. Finally, some EU member states have chosen to resort to coordination with external parties rather than with the European Union. One of the most famous current examples of this is the tangible approach between the New Greek government and Russia.

Suleiman was interested in highlighting the reasons for placing the national interests of the member states above the supranational interests of the European Union, as one of the explanatory variables for the discrepancy between the foreign policy of the European Union and the foreign policies of

the member states, without addressing the different manifestations of this contradiction.

On the other hand, there are some important conclusions by Abdel Aleem (2015) regarding the changes that have occurred in the Maghreb countries since the Arab Spring and not only conflict of interests; pointing to some lessons learned from the experiences of these countries that must be taken into consideration when dealing with the Middle East after the Arab spring revelations. They are as follows:

- 1- In light of the political changes, which have occurred in the Maghreb region, many challenges may impede the desired reforms in these countries, on top of which comes the economic problems, and the escalation of jihadists threats, which is more than before, especially the most prominent threat to the entire Middle East region, which is the organization ISIS.
- 2- North African countries require continued focus on reforming institutions and improving the quality of governance in security, the economy, and public services.
- 3- Achieving security without economic growth may lead to stability in the short term only, but it will not address popular demands for economic opportunity and dignity. Conversely, without ensuring security, the government's economic initiatives are vulnerable to increased threats from jihadist terrorism or extrajudicial violence.
- 4- Efforts to build strong institutions in North African countries must include regional cooperation between these countries, which is not currently achieved. Certainly, ensuring stability in any of the Maghreb countries will reflect positively on other countries among it.
- 5- For the west (the United States and the European Union) to maintain its influence in the Maghreb, they must take care of the presence of strong institutions in the areas in regard of security, governance, and the economy in these countries, and work, for example; to improve the capabilities of the police forces, train judges, and promote reforms in the public sector in order to fight corruption and achieve transparency.

SECOND TOPIC: OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN DETRIMENTS, WHICH SHAPE EU POLICIES TOWARDS THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES.

- **5+5 initiative dialogue** started in the 90s, but after the fall of Berlin, it started to react powerfully seeking to combine the dialogue between the Arab Maghreb and the European community. This is a profound tactic to provide more interrelated policies and the relationship between them in terms of aspiration and possibilities (Nunez, 2012). 5+5 dialogue has been held in December 2012 between the western Mediterranean countries. (Bruke, 2013).
- EU was concerned with different pillars that shape its policy towards the south region to treat some phenomena that articulate the mentioned region. **ENP (European Neighborhood Policy), 2004** instrument was an important one, which targets achieving prosperity in terms of economy, stability, and peace in the Mediterranean region through structuring bilateral relations between EU and its neighboring countries, besides the support of financial assistance. ENP wants a more solid prospect of democracy. It is about an action plan policy that emerges with social and political reforms to be implemented whether in short or medium terms (Shafel, 2011).
- ENP: Does not provide relevant and adequate incentives for the political elites, and the societies concerned to tackle far-reaching economic and political reforms. (Sarato and Schumacher, 2005) EU combined the **Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)** and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), in 2005 clarifying the concept of migration with the Euro-Arab Mediterranean institutional. This was intensified by the EU blue card under the auspicious of the European council in 2009. It aims at facilitating the entry of professional employees to the EU with a legally permitted residence. This is very much promoted and encouraged by accessing work permits in the EU and issuing the visa for this kind of legal permission. Upon this more bonding synergy and be created between parties of EU and the Arab Mediterranean (European Commission, 2010).

- **The Union for the Mediterranean (UPM)**, 2008. It is the framework of multilateral relations between the EU and the Mediterranean non-EU countries, and it is a continuation of the ENP. Aimed at achieving regional cohesion, growth, and integration for the whole place politically and economically (European Commission, 2009). Unfortunately, before Arab spring, UFM faced funding shortfalls, this was mainly due to a lack of enthusiasm between EU member states for the UFM outside Paris. In the meantime, after Arab Spring, UFM was received with little enthusiasm in Maghreb, it only focused on regional investment and development i.e; undertaking projects like building trans-Maghreb transport links a desalination plant in Gaza. (Burke, 2013).
- **Migration partnership** is an agreement initiated by Switzerland in 2008, aimed at having a balance of interest for the assigned parties to control all the relevant inclusive areas of migration. The agreement takes a bilateral form (FDGP, FOM, 2008).

THIRD TOPIC:

A GLANCE AT EU POLICY (FROM THE 90S-2011)

- **From the 90s till 9/2001.** The Maghreb countries were dissatisfied with the EU's indifferent attitude towards terrorism in the region. And in 9/2001, European foreign policy is grasped to laws' codification to minimize dangers resulting from terrorism. EU policy to encounter terrorism in the Maghreb and especially North African countries was envisaged to refine the situation there, but under the conceptualization of interests of the EU, Western regimes only weigh its normative security perspective (Allani, Monan, Mueller, Puscas, and Watanabe, 2011).
- **After 2011,** the crawling of terrorism and organized crimes were highly recognized, but unfortunately, the EU elaborated its contribution reasons for interference according to its private interests in the region, as well. (Allani, Monan, Mueller, Puscas and Watanabe, 2011). The occurrence of the change in these countries was internal promotional and upraise e.g. Tunisia. The current situation offers a chance for the EU to reshape its interference policy towards the stated region. Theoretically, the EU can offer non-bureaucratic and efficient material support to their actual transitional period for the stated Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria). Also, EU inclination in the region should be highly framed because of several current issues such as the reliability of energy supply,

increased migration, and terrorism. Based on the previous, an agenda for 2011 is prepared for discussing the concurrent and contemporary issues. **ENP and UFM** were not successful, to an extent, due to the radical changes that are occurring in the region. In addition to their functions, they started to step backward and reduce their credibility because their policies were mainly towards coordination with governments and not civil societies (shafel, 2011).

- **A comparative contribution,** It can be deduced that the EU's contribution in the Maghreb countries before the uprising was static and based on a mutual relationship, in consideration of both interests of the parties. While after 2011, and due to the reluctant situation in the assigned region EU instruments started to appeal in a form that might be advocated positively or negatively, as will be illustrated further in the paper.

EU AND MOROCCO: THE JEOPARDIZE OF MIGRATION

In 1960 and 1970, migration in Europe was a benign phenomenon that was only directed toward legal labor licenses. In the 80s it was the migrants' refugee phenomenon. The supreme danger of immigration was in the 90s which was the emerge of clandestine immigration. Despite the EMP's presence, the area turned to be a basin for debates. The number started to decline in 2001 due to rigid border control. (MPC, 2013). While in 1990, Morocco has evolved to be one of the core countries that absorbed migrants from sub-Saharan countries. Asylum and refugees reached a population of 1.351 individuals. In this regard, the illegal immigration crisis started to occur, and a great focus of attention has been directed to the situation in North Africa (Arrach, 2014).

EU /MOROCCO COOPERATION

BEFORE 2011

Cooperation Agreements since 1976 were valid. But the concern was since the 90s, especially in 1995, the Barcelona process was a good platform establishment for cooperation partnerships in the field of social, cultural, security, and human affairs. And in 2008, followed by **ENP**, in which this agreement articulates a road map for enlarging the scope of cooperation between EU and Morocco in some main areas, i.e. closer political relations and finding a common ground for focusing on human dimensions. In 2008, there was a bilateral agreement enhancing joint ventures between the EU and

Morocco kingdom. **ENP** sustained the relation between the preferential mentioned entities covering political, economic, financial, social, and human dimensions. In 2010, The Granada summit Between the EU and Morocco has established a positive assessment for committing and developing their political, economic, and social aspects (Martin, 2009). Although **ENP** has concerns about important contemporary issues between the EU and Morocco such as the advanced issue of illegal immigration, in reality, aspects of cooperation were more affiliated with Morocco's special needs of democratization. (Arrach, 2014).

AFTER 2011

New vigorous issues addressing immigration and terrorism are taking more places. Because the instruments of the **ENP** as indicated by Del Sarto/Schumacher 2005, didn't succeed in reaching policy objectives and unfortunately ENP won't be capable of contributing in connecting its neighbors to the prosperity of sustainability. Meanwhile, the situation after the Arab spring and the occurrence of war and unrest in the sub-region has led the EU to change its attitude, pave a different way of thinking towards the southern Mediterranean, and acknowledge the issue of Migration. European Union realized that this phenomenon will jeopardize the rights of migrants in the EU and Morocco, (Arrach, 2014). In this regards EU and policymakers have become increasingly concerned with migration flows into the EU originating from low and middle-income countries including these new neighbors.

The European Union has strengthened its approach towards external migration by establishing a migration policy called renewed **Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)** to protect immigrants' human rights. In addition to its adoption of five types of measures in response to human movements, **which are:** Monitoring of Border control and surveillance, Authorities in North Africa should cooperate in lessening migration, demonstrate mobility legislative proposals, minimizing the refugee crisis in North Africa, and differentiation between refugees and illegal migrants. These measures were mainly a contribution to Morocco's immigration as it is relevant to its policy. It also considers the main aim in terms of securing EU member states from these illegal phenomena (Arrach, 2014).

Morocco was the first country in the Mediterranean, which engaged in such an agreement with the EU migration and mobility partnership. It was

supposed to be a fruitful one seeking to gain improvements in the field of education, business profession, and legal visa issuing. Regarding, illegal migration, firm actions were illustrated to be taken to avoid smuggling and trafficking (European Commission, 2013).

A comparative contribution, from my point of view, before 2011 the instrument of using **ENP** was a successful one for enhancing and deepening the economic, political, social, and financial relations between Morocco and the EU. In addition to advocating Morocco's correct way toward democratization. However, this was contrary to what has been mentioned by Del Sarto/ Schumacher (Del.A., 2005), and his opinion of the failure of this policy towards achieving security and prosperity development in the region. Accordingly, this was a catalyst for the EU to adopt the **GAMM mobility** that had some border control at that time. But this, to an extent, might reveal some contradictions to the human rights of migration due to UN principles. So, both before and after, no real positive contribution incentives are relatively indicated.

In general, Morocco also receives EU net funding for programs for promoting democracy. In a matter that King Mohammed VI, like his predecessor King Hassan II, both were full power control. And Because of the strong relations between the current and former monarchs, on one hand, and European political elites, on the other, it is difficult for the EU to propose comprehensive reforms, which could undermine the power of the ruling king (2017، عيد الغفار). But Eu declared that Morocco is on the path to democracy and has learned the lesson from the Arab spring but has still some way to go. (Burke, 2013).

EU/ALGERIA AND ENERGY ACCESSIBILITY

As a result of the conflict that occurred between Russia and Ukraine in 2006, Russia cut off its energy supply to some EU countries. This attitude has generated a kind of European insecurity towards its energy policy. Based on this, Europe foresees the sources of energy production. The other natural zones aside from Russia are Northern Africa and the Persian Gulf. EU vigorously needs to secure its energy security and thought of getting coherent to northern Africa especially Algeria (Quemdaand Delgado, 2011, P. 11:38).

The relationship between the Eu and Algeria is stable and this is obvious due to the Amenas hostage in Algeria. And on the other hand, Algeria found Eu as an important partner to it. This is asserted by ENP (2004).

(European Neighborhood policy), in which the Eu offers financial assistance to countries within the European Neighborhood.

Because of Algeria's high expectations of needed reforms and its issue as a gas supporter, the Eu is ensuring and initializing different legislation to invest there. And as sustained by the said of " Council Fule The commissioner of the European neighborhood" After the conclusion of the EU – Algeria we have high hopes for socio-economic reforms in Algeria which can stimulate business, private domestic and foreign investments and thereby create jobs"(Giannolis,2012).

BEFORE 2011

Despite the presence of EMP (Euro Mediterranean partnership) 1995 which was the pivotal improvement and correlated relationship between North-South relations in the Mediterranean and then ENP 2003 followed by the Union of Mediterranean UFM. EU-Algerian relations were characterized by a lack of compatibility between these foreign policies and with what is concerned by Algeria's special issues' foreign policy.

In the beginning, Algeria had a negative attitude towards ENP, but an improvement occurred in the early years of the Bouteflika presidency. As he tried to restore his new regime by establishing a new foreign policy. A powerful reason behind this was to heal Algeria's wound of acquiring a bad reputation especially, after the events of 9/11 which put it on the war and Terror road map by the US. As a result, a codified relation with the EU was utilized for this purpose. In accordance, this transformation was witnessed by the Algerian energy sector in 2000, by noticing no further interrelated coherence to **ENP and UFM**. As the UFM solar energy ambition failed to destroy Algeria's reluctance towards its frustration attitude. Consequentially, the government announced a collaboration for developing energy. As a result, the framework of EU-Algeria energy cooperation must take into account the existing trend of energy relationships (Darbouche, 2010).

AFTER 2011

Energy was raised to be a priority of interest in the Mediterranean as declared by the EU executive. In this context, gas has been regarded as a precious issue for both the EU and Algeria. The latter will turn out to be the EU's partner at the bilateral and regional levels. EU started to import gas. In 2012, exchanges were estimated to be more than the other global trades regarding gas (EuroActiv, 2013). On the 5th of October, 2012, Algeria has

signed the ratified convection on preferential rules of origin for the pan Euro Mediterranean area. This convection facilitates the reciprocal process of exports and imports between the EU and Algeria. This may result in more economic opportunities and achievements (European Commission, 2014).

Algeria started negotiations with the EU about possible reforms to the ENP. This was clear through Cathrine Ashton's declaration that the EU welcomed this relation by issuing three new finance agreements to provide small and medium businesses (Burke, 2013).

COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION

From my point of view, is an estimated contribution to the previous illustration that ENP and UFM are no more than theoretical agreements aimed at achieving proper, stable bilateral and regional relationships in the Mediterranean region? As a matter of fact, real activation is prohibited due to the conflicting interests between north and south, as Algeria before in the 90s up till 9/2001 didn't admire the ENP and UFM efforts. On the contrary, it started to improve its situation for the sake of its reputation after 9/2001. Also, it cared too much about its interest after 2011 and signed the conviction in 2012 fearing from uprisings spillover.

In general, the EU chose to support autocratic President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, whom the EU considered to be the guarantor of political stability in Algeria, instead of, encouraging and establishing democracy in North Africa, and this effort in Algeria's European relations attitude became clear to the post-revolution period. (عبد الغفار، 2017).

EU AND TUNISIA A- DEMOCRACY AND B-IMMIGRATION

Cooperation in terms of trading relations between both sides was enhanced regarding imports and exports. Relations with the EU were crucial. This was so obvious through the 75% of Tunisia's exports that go to the EU and 64% of its imports come from the EU (2008) and the Barcelona process in 1995 to establish a free trade zone with the EU, followed and continued by the first plan (2005-2010) under the European Neighborhood in 2005, then in 2010, a new action Plan (2011-2016) for promoting and progressing accessibility to more European programs participation. But due to the uprising, preamble and concrete events occurred (Schafel, 2011).

BEFORE 2011

A. DEMOCRACY ISSUE

The Barcelona agreement aimed at growing and strengthening the political and social system of the members of the Mediterranean countries (MNCs). In 1998, Tunisia was the first Mediterranean country which approved and ratified the clauses of the Barcelona agreement. This was implemented and processed in terms of financial aid, where the EU allocated a specific amount of loans to Tunisia, which in turn gradually decreased Tunisia's trade and tariff barriers. A major benefit of this agreement was that it gave more credibility to the Tunisian reforms resulting in increasing the flow of its inward direct investment (IDIS) (Cassarino, 1999, P. 59:74).

The Barcelona declaration was a catalyst for enhancing both the economic and political liberalization of Tunisia. In accordance with that, the democracy of the country was improved, together with the encouragement of small firms and flows of IDIS. This structural Tunisian reform aimed at long-term country stability, where it was divided into two phases. The first phase (from 1998 to 2001) was the Tunisian's ability to face international competition by allocating their funds between the government and the EU. While the second phase from (2001 to 2008) targeted maintaining its reform program. Consequentially, this program accelerated its rate of exports by 60-70 percent (Cassarino, 1999, P. 59:74).

B. IMMIGRATION ISSUES

Until the late 1990s, Tunisians were not allowed to cross the Italian borders without entry visas. In 1999, Italy introduced the idea of creating the Schengen area aiming to have a borderless European Union zone. It imposed restrictions on non-EU citizens entering from outside. Consequently, landing restrictions were introduced in Lampedusa for non-Europeans and entry visas were mandated leading to many resorting to clandestine travel. A consequential deduction is that this kind of immigration resulted in the emergence of smuggling acts and generated threats of terrorism, especially after September 2001 (Ben-yahoyada, 2011).

In 2000, the EU started to take action by building frontline border controls (Frontex) to curb and minimize the flow of illegal immigrants to Italy, prevent smuggling, human trafficking and terrorism. The EU started strict and vigorous scanning and inspection of the area to seize and prevent human trafficking boats carrying clandestine migrants from reaching

Lampedusa. Also, agreements have been signed between the EU and North African countries to send back captured illegal boats (Ben-yahoyada, 2011).

AFTER 2011

A. DEMOCRACY, B-IMMIGRATION).

In 2011, Tunisia was exposed to the revolution experience, fleets of immigrants took Italy as a haven for landing. Rome asked for help from the EU, fearing the upcoming danger of migrants after 44,000 migrants landed in Lampedusa from January to mid-February. Italy hosted them only for a short period and then repatriated them back (Ben-yahoyada, 2011). The EU supported Tunisia in the period between 2012-2015 with 4 billion Euros including 2.5 billion Euros in loans and 1.5 billion Euros as development assistance. (Burke, 2013)

As a matter of fact, all the previously mentioned discussions which were concerned by the ENP process had no success. The reason behind this was the lack of engagement and disconnect between the delegation of the European Commission and its Embassies with the Tunisian civil society at different levels. The EU didn't bond strongly to create a strong relationship with the civil societies in Tunisia. This led to the absence of EU unity in performing its political, economic, and social reforms to the required level. This is supported by the great extent of the disregard of EU protocols for human rights. (Dennison, Dworkin, Popescu, and Witney, 2011).

AFTER 2011, DUE TO A-MIGRATION,

As a result of the huge number of Tunisians who have rested their anchors in Lampedusa, the EU has employed a mission investigating and monitoring the phenomena according to the Frontex data which detected the huge number of Tunisians, have landed there. In the case of managing this immigration influx, the EU should solve the problem with the Tunisian government regarding how it will cooperate in terms of the sequence to arrange their return back.

B. DEMOCRACY

Achievements could be refined and then implemented through many assumptions that could facilitate and enrich the assistance of the EU to Tunisia for sustaining democracy after 2011. For instance, facilitation of issuing visas for the Tunisians and reducing it from Euro 65 to Euro 30. Also, the exchange of employees to have university studies and visa work

permissions. There was an aim for building structural multi-systems parties. What was processed is the occurrence of Election observation. Suggestions of reform improvements are a lot but to what extent is it achievable? (Dennison, Dworkin, Popescu, and Witney, 2011). Although the European Commission has specialized 110 million Euro for development projects and 90 million Euro for economic recovery issues and 20 million Euro for the modernization services policies and the Outstanding Partnership Action Plan between 2013 and 2017, details the current agenda of cooperation between Tunisia and the European Union and is funded mainly under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership (ENP) Mechanism, which includes specifications for the sectors and processes to be funded. (عبد الغفار، 2017). ENP doesn't have a vision in the form of clear procedures to reform progress. Also, the new ENP that has been introduced in May 2011, failed to take place in the period 2010-2012. As actual activation will not be before 2014 in terms of democratization and the rule of law. This is in addition to the underestimated amount of funds, that were supposed to be given to the southern Mediterranean region. This amount was allocated for two main axes, which are sustainable development and reforming democracy. Due to that, the EU didn't contribute to any modified change and progress in the democratization process in the region and alternatively, the US was the substitution stance for enriching this issue (Isaac, 2012. P.39).

COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION:

A deduction can be made regarding the issue of democracy before 2011. That EU has been revaluated successfully and all the above-mentioned instruments were activated. However, after 2011, the aimed targets were not achievable because of the lack of coordination between the EU and the Tunisian civil society. Regarding immigration, the equilibrium of EU inputs was the same even with what had been submitted to Morocco.

EU AND MAGHREB COUNTRIES, SECURITY ISSUES

Before 2011, European foreign policy affairs were indifferent toward the Maghreb countries. All the concern was about how to deal with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) especially in Algeria as it is considered a central country for migrants' transition (Allani, Monan, Mueller, Puscas, and Watanabe, 2011).

After 2011, we do have a common security issue intersecting the Maghreb countries together, especially Algeria and Morocco which is

terrorism. Own view, this phenomenon is so much clear, when discussing the stance of the EU and its intervention in the Mali (Sahel) conflict. This incident has clarified the dimensions of how the EU, Algeria, and Morocco were interrelated in the complexity of this issue by identifying the perspective of each of them. Northern Mali is simply an area that is controlled by various Tuareg rebel groups, between March 2012 and January 2013. This area had a level of political insecurity and limited mobility (Moseley, 2013).

It was emphasized by the international press that North Mali's problems are characterized by the following problems: The northeast of Mali had become fertile soil for crime execution, Islamic terrorism, and insecurity. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was considered to be a symptom of contamination in the southern Sahara (Morgan, 2012). EU's role should be having a real impact on Mali's legitimacy, but its involvement was limited in providing training, financial and logistics support (Francis, 2013). EU required having a helper to hinder this terroristic dilemma. It articulates the importance of solidarity with African ownership and mingling their efforts to solve this crisis. Accordingly, The EU declared its need for Morocco and Algeria to accelerate the area's problem-solving (Benmehdi, 2013).

Morocco: Morocco has increasingly supported Mali since September 2013. Rabat robust its ties with Bamako through signing bilateral agreements, and involvement in stabilizing Mali's political future. (The Middle East, 2014).

While Algeria, by 2013, refused the contribution of the EU to interfere military in Mali because of their difficult experience and history of war. Algeria is now only mandating stability. It is avoiding any suspected disturbances in the region. Algeria is trying to take the necessary measures to guarantee the protection of its borders at the highest possible level because it has suffered from the agony of war. It is cautious to interfere, because of its fear of Mali's situation spilling over in its borders and the increase in the number of refugees in its southern areas (Dennison, 2011). Algeria's situation is clear, especially after experiencing a lot from the war counter-terrorism. So, it stabilizes its situation politically after signing the social agreement with the EU sustained by the 5+5 initiative agreement, which tends to achieve progress with the western defense policy especially with France and Italy, in 2008 and 2011, respectively for acquiring patrol boats (Nunez, 2012).

Comparative contribution. The moment rising question here is, did EU intervention in Mali succeed? The answer is no, because the crisis is still existing. The issue is that the EU has an eye on Mali's natural resources and its abundance of irrigable land, especially along the Niger River. In addition to the presence of the Energy treasure in the Maghreb countries especially Algeria. That's why the EU insisted to enforce Algeria to involve in this conflict.

CONCLUSION

The combat of interest between Maghreb countries and the EU and late responses of taking the progressive actions, mainly originated from concentrating of each European country upon its interests and attitudes towards the region with no good solidarity between them plus EU's own interests in the region (Isaac, 2012. P.39). It is concluded that EU's actions to an extent were static before 2011 towards the Maghreb countries in Morocco, as mentioned above, EU's attitudes were almost the same, so no further positive inclusion is achieved. In the case of Algeria, the instruments of the EU didn't inject motivation for it to get into real cooperation with the EU. But what motivates Algeria is its reputation and security immunization in front of the whole world. This is so much more obvious not in the energy case, but in its rejected stance towards solving Mali's crisis. Although I do agree with its stance, the intervention of the EU itself in Mali didn't sum any positive pluses as the existence of the crisis is still valid. The same was applied in the case of democracy in Tunisia, the EU didn't modify any positive improvements other than the election observation process.

So, no improvements have been added by the EU assistance to the region, and no lessening to the negative impacts there. But on the contrary, the EU is acquiring more benefits from the region in addition to power exercise as well.

Before the Arab spring: The EU 's ambition is to reform only the Mediterranean's Economic situation, as the EU thought that increasing prosperity will lead to peaceful political evolution in the region. Before the revolution, the EU's Mediterranean member-state enjoyed greater influence over policy in the southern countries. The Eu had a strong belief that it could promote political reform through economic liberalization, which was ineffectively approved. (Burke, 2013).

After the Arab spring: EU member states do not have sufficient funds to deal with the economic problems in the southern neighborhood. EU's response results were very limited as more principle wasn't meaningful enough in terms of democracy change for the Maghreb countries. (Burke, 2013).

The previous, dependency upon the EU is not a solution to solve Arab's or northern Africa's crisis. Accordingly, the researcher will discuss some crucial points pro and against the EU situation and can EU improve and do better for the whole situation. - Some important issues might be considered as threats prohibiting the EU **from** further reforms.

A. COMMON INTERNAL ISSUES THAT EMERGED FROM THE THREE COUNTRIES

These issues are:

- 1- Islamism is mainstream: they were a threat not only in terms of just social and religious movements but also as political parties, which are expected to govern, i.e., fear of elections in Morocco in November 2011, bringing to movement the first Islamic government, revived activities of Islamists in Algeria, Nahda party in Tunisia.
- 2- The deep state has not gone away: Albeit all the enthusiasm of the Arab revolutions, but interests of the deep states and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are still present, i.e. The Makhzan in **Morocco** (the monarchy, notables, landowners, tribal leaders and sheiks, senior military personnel, security directors and chiefs, and another member of executive institution) are all around the royal court. Also, in **Algeria**, the army, and president Bouteflika have no real intention or plans to open their society.
- 3- The economic situation is very bad: in terms of tourism in Morocco and the increasing subsidies in fuel and funds in 2011 according to IMF. (Witney and Dworkin, 2012) pp 20-23.

B. EXTERNAL REASONS THAT EMERGED FROM BRUSSELS

After the revolutions, the EU's interest was mainly to consolidate democratic reform in North Africa as if democracy didn't occur, this will be a threat to Europe. In a matter of fact, whereby Brussels promotes democracy and human rights, and member states, which are the greatest countries, were quite explicit and involved, as (France, Italy, and Spain) main concerns were their short-term national interests. (Witney and Dworkin, 2012) P.8

EU and its member-state assistance to the countries of the Arab spring has been limited compared with the resources and also compared to what has been submitted to others as what has been done to Iraq and Kosovo. (Burke, 2013).

Individual European countries are interested in a short-term and bilateral agenda with each North African country in terms of security and economic issues, where this reality has clarified a clear danger to EU-North African relations, as these interests come at the expense of establishing democracy, protecting human rights and upholding the rule of law. (عبد الغفار ، عادل 2017).

France's position is pivotal, as it is considered to be the biggest investor in North Africa. Italy and France have submitted national interests at stake, investment, and energy. France invests in North Africa and particularly in Morocco, while Italy is a big investor in Algeria. (Witney and Dworkin, 2012).

HOW CAN EUROPE DO BETTER?

- 1- Europe should not only rely on ENP as it's considered to be an economic instrument that does not rely on diplomatic, potential, and security support for Arab spring in North Africa.
- 2- Member states grumble that they don't know what Brussels wants to do towards North Africa.
- 3- Europe should not always seek an opportunity to align and reshape North Africa according to its values and interests.
- 4- Brussels and the member states must arrive at shared and specific policies. Sharing information will complement the limited tools of Brussels disposal with another instrument which includes tools of military, political and economical to work incoherent with member states and in their hands. So, knowing the priorities of the member states particularly France, Spain and Italy are important to build common and bonding policies between the EU and the member states and always in collaboration.
- 5- Intra-regional is a key to growth and this could be achieved by:
 - a) Supporting major interactive projects, like solar power development (a win-win situation for both sides of the Mediterranean).
 - b) Finding ways to eliminate any kind of disputes of Western Sahara to create better Algerian Moroccan relations.

- c) Sorting out ways to diplomatic tools by both Brussels and member-states to work together to treat North Africa as partners rather than clients.
- 1- Applying the 3Ms policy in the post-uprising. This policy is enough fine for tuning the quantities of aid that grant the North-African countries based on their progress in terms of fair elections, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and rule of law.
 - 2- EU should consider that national stakes will not change.
 - 3- Binding the interests of the member states together to reach a common strategy. (Witney and Dworkin,2012)
 - 4- Building strong security relationships in the region in a matter of linking all EU strategies and programs for the Maghreb and Sahel to tackle security issues and military cooperation and the 5+5 dialogue should be deepened with participation between Eu institutions and northern EU member states, this technique will put the Maghreb countries on the same table with the Sahel to discuss the security issues.
 - 5- Educational reform in the region should be established, i.e. information and communication technology.
 - 6- More Assistance to democratic reforms and promotion and generally needs to moderate its rhetoric on democracy and conditionality. All that should be applied without pretending that there is progress on reform.
 - 7- Encouraging civil service reform in the region... (Burke, 2013).

IMPROVEMENTS TOWARDS MOROCCO

- 1- The country should not be driven by a technocratic assessment process in terms of box-ticking unless by applying scrutiny of policy strategy.
- 2- Europe should concentrate on avoiding corruption and concentrate on deep democracy.
- 3- European actors in Brussels should be more interested in their collaboration in the sense of pushing the kingdom towards more democratic reforms.

IMPROVEMENT TOWARDS TUNISIA

EU should not close an eye on the concentration of wealth and economic power in the palace.

IMPROVEMENTS TOWARDS ALGERIA

Since Europe knows that Algeria is affected by France's trajectory, then Brussels and France should be team players, as France would be a major pivotal in the future in balancing Algerian's reform and its security concerns.

Summing up, all the cases require the concerned capitals (Paris, Madrid, and Rome), which is crucial to compromise between fully democratic transitions and the persistence of important national interests of the three countries.

If any directed and concrete assistance is needed from the EU side, it might act as a high profile and revise its whole policy towards the region with encompassing 3 axis points, democracy, security, and economic development in consideration, through the enthusiastic attitude and reframing its instruments regarding ENP with the bilateral agreement, mobility agreements, and 5+5 initiative. In addition to overall performance to gain southern credibility through efficient political dialogue support (Issac, 2012).

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