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دورية علمية محكمة

المجلد العاشر (العدد التاسع عشر، يناير 2025)

The Paradoxes of the Welfare State in Egypt: Constructing a Welfare State through Legitimacy ⁽¹⁾

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(1) تم تقديم البحث في 2024/3/16، وتم قبوله للنشر في 2024/5/27.

Abstract

Social policies in Egypt have been an integral part in the institutionalization of the welfare state since the 19th century. It is argued that high levels of legitimacy could only be achieved through the expansion in social policies' expenditures. The research paper investigates the existence of a welfare state in Egypt, and its relationship to legitimacy from 2013- 2023. The paper argues that welfarism require a liberal democratic context to be developed. Social expenditures are not a sufficient prerequisite for establishing a welfare state. The first part discusses conceptual issues related to welfarism and relationship to achieving legitimacy. The second part analyses the implemented welfare policies by the state during the period 2013-2023 and draws on historical comparisons of welfare policies during different political regimes pre- and post-independence of Egypt in 1952. The third part examines the formation and transformation of welfare provisions in Egypt, the continuity and change in the welfare system focusing on the period between 2013-2023. The fourth part analyzes the questionnaire results that was addressed to fifty-seven policy and decision makers. The questionnaire results and the research analyses conclude that Egypt does not have a clear philosophy on welfarism. What exists is a quasy welfare state, or in other words a non- mature welfare state. The research concluded that the Egyptian government's social policies and welfare approaches are still beset by a number of issues, including weak democratic practices and non-inclusiveness.

Keywords: Welfare – Legitimacy- Egypt- Welfare Regimes - Liberalism

مفارقة دولة الرفاه في مصر: بناء دولة الرفاه عبر الشرعية

الملخص

كانت السياسات الاجتماعية في مصر جزءاً لا يتجزأ من مأسسة دولة الرفاه منذ القرن التاسع عشر. ويسود الاعتقاد بأن المستويات العالية من الشرعية لا يمكن تحقيقها إلا من خلال التوسع في الانفاق الاجتماعي. وتدرس الورقة البحثية حقيقة وجود دولة رفاه في مصر، وعلاقتها بتحقيق الشرعية خلال الفترة من 2013 إلى 2023. وترى الورقة أن وجود دولة الرفاه يتطلب تطوير سياق ديمقراطي ليبرالي. فالإنفاق الاجتماعي بمفرده ليست شرطاً كافياً لإقامة دولة الرفاه. ويناقش الجزء الأول من الورقة البحثية القضايا المفاهيمية المتعلقة بالرفاه وعلاقته بتحقيق الشرعية. ويحلل الجزء الثاني سياسات

الرفاه التي نفذتها الدولة خلال الفترة من 2013-2023 ويعتمد على المقارنات التاريخية لسياسات الرفاه خلال الأنظمة السياسية المختلفة قبل وبعد استقلال مصر عام 1952. ويبحث الجزء الثالث في تشكيل وتحول مفهوم دولة الرفاه في مصر، الاستمرارية والتغير في نظام الرفاه بالتركيز على الفترة ما بين 2013-2023. ويحلل الجزء الرابع نتائج الاستبيان الذي تم توجيهه إلى سبعة وخمسين من صناع السياسات والقرارات. وقد خلصت نتائج الورقة البحثية ونتائج الاستبيان إلى أن مصر ليس لديها فلسفة واضحة لدولة الرفاه. كما أن الموجود هو شبه دولة رفاه، أو بمعنى آخر دولة رفاه غير ناضجة. وخلص البحث إلى أن السياسات الاجتماعية وبرامج الرعاية الاجتماعية التي تطبقها الحكومة المصرية لا تزال تعاني من عدد من الإشكاليات، منها ضعف الممارسات الديمقراطية في تطبيقها وعدم شموليتها.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الرفاه - الشرعية - مصر - أنظمة الرفاه - الليبرالية

Introduction

Thomas Hobbes noted in Leviathan that sovereign states are set up to control social interactions and prevent the "war of all against all" that would ensue in the absence of the rule of law. The desire for gain, safety and glory are the three causes for war between people. (Merriam, Charles Edward, 1906). Thus, welfare provision was considered a prerequisite for a stable and harmonious society. Since the middle of the twentieth century, the world has lived ideological disputes over the meaning of welfarism and equality due to the shift in political and economic conditions, which led to the breaking down of the consensus over welfarism. Its future is still unclear. The issue of equality alone has provoked intense debate when it has been attributed to "social justice" and to the distribution of wealth or income in society. In most parts of the world the cause of equality and social justice has been associated with calls for the growth of some kind of social welfare.

Therefore, the welfare state – with social justice at its heart- will continue to be a vital component of political legitimacy and a precondition to prevent instability and war around the world including in the Middle East. This could only happen by providing social protection against social dangers, empowering citizens and assuring income would be adequate in that sense.

The welfare state is also closely connected with the idea of legitimacy. Social policies worry people in different countries because they reflect unachievable promises that would be jeopardized by the discrepancy between

nominal GDP growth and public spending. If social policies are not effectively implemented there will be a risk to solidarity.

Another issue related to social policies is “social risk”, which refers to socio-economic shifts including striking the balance between work and family life, like families giving up a portion of their income to support elderly or disabled family members or daycare providers. As a result, people may encounter frequent unemployment. Low-skilled jobs may be not regulated and depriving employees’ social security benefits. As Bonoli noted, these dangers are linked to the features of the post-industrialization labor market. (Bonoli, G., 2015).

A welfare state can only function in a liberal democratic context. Democratic practices expanding the welfare state. Numerous academics have examined the idea that authoritarian regimes are conducive to the adoption and growth of social welfare programs, but evidence from developing nations demonstrates that electoral competition and democratic transition push governments to broaden social policies and take into account the preferences of various interest groups, making social policies more equitable. Therefore, welfarism does not mean merely relying on government initiatives. The private sector's solutions to social problems and social entrepreneurship are being influenced by understandings of need, and it has been introduced in the context of a mixed economy of welfarism. Also, power dynamics and social relations of various social actors and accommodating interests of unions, and between political parties and officials, and between officials and lobbyists and cross-class alliances are considered important political determinants of social policy. (Brewis, Georgina, 2021)

This explains why the development and sustainability of welfare provision was limited to industrialized societies in order to address the social vulnerabilities that came with open economies.

Part one

a. Problem statement

Policy makers in Egypt perceive the present architecture of social policies in Egypt policy to be structured within a welfare state. This is demonstrated by the state’s provision of a vast number of social services since its independence in 1952. The research paper argues that welfarism did not receive sufficient considerations in Egypt and its continuous effort to improve social services did not lead to a welfare state and did not increase

opportunities for empowerment, nor did it increase the legitimacy and the stability of the political regime during the period 2013-2023.

b. Objectives of the study

The aim of the research paper is to study the relationship between the expansion of social policy and the welfare state, conceptually defining the welfare state and its nature from a legitimacy approach, and to study the reasons behind the growth of the social spending in Egypt. Also, the research paper aims also at investigating if political democratization of social policy should necessarily be accomplished by authoritarian regime.

c. Significance of the study

Many studies on social policies in Egypt start from a conviction that Egypt offers the most comprehensive welfare system in Africa and the Middle East. This conviction is based on discussing social policies as a given reality. Also, they define welfare as only social spending on the poor. They focus on the practical aspects of social policies such as social spending and social demands and its evaluation without discussing the political context in which these social policies occur and operate. This study further this understanding through comparing the different welfare policies in pre and post-independence Egypt by examining the relationship between welfare systems and legitimacy. The study improves the understanding of the philosophy and nature of welfarism and its political context in Egypt during the period 2013-2023. The paper's findings could be of practical value in improving the welfare approach and philosophy in Egypt.

d. Scope and limitations of the study

Welfarism is a broad concept and is loaded with political and socio-economic dilemma. The study focuses on the employment of classical welfare approaches on Egypt post 2011 revolution, which called for bread, liberty, social justice and human dignity. The literature on the expansion of social policies examines a number of factors and theoretical frameworks, including power relations theory, resources theory, structuralist theory, and legitimacy theory, that could motivate, encourage, or force the state to do so. However, this study will focus on discussing the relationship between welfarism and legitimacy.

e. Method and Data

The research paper uses qualitative methods by comparing philosophies, programs and types of welfare state in Egypt since its

independence in 1952. It also applies quantitative methods by implementing a survey addressed to policy and decision makers in Egypt using various indicators such as characteristics of social provisions, extension, cost, size of expenditure, targeting policies, types of welfare institutions and legitimacy indicators such as the well-being and satisfaction of citizens.

f. Review of literature

The literature on the welfare state has evolved over time. Part of the literature on welfare focus on the political regime in which welfarism occurs whether in democratic non-democratic, industrialized and non-industrial countries. Shryock, Van Der Veen and Taylor have taken diverse approaches in attempting to understand the factors affecting the development of a welfare state. Literature highlights welfare pluralism, development and industrialization, and the growing role of government in social control, provision, and welfare states across various countries. Common themes in the literature include the role of charities, religious and voluntary organizations in what is described as welfare pluralism. Other texts explain the impact of industrialization and urbanization on the expansion of a welfare state from one side, managing, and paradigms of managed liberalization from the other side without jeopardizing individualism and citizens' rights. (H. Shryock, R. 1927, Van Der Veen., Mara., 2002, Taylor-Gooby, Peter, 1997)

Other literature emphasizes the ideas that the welfare state is a result of political change, including social movements such as labor movements within a class struggle and the evolution of the role of unions. Advocators of Karl Marx emphasize the role of working-class movements and class struggle. Policy transfer and imitation, such as the English Poor Law and Conditional Cash Transfers, have influenced welfare in countries like the United States and Australia. Also, extending civil rights is seen among the drivers of welfare state and overcoming social cleavages. (Inglehart, R., 1977, E. Miller, Martini, 2013, Hacene, Hami, 2021)

The type of welfare state is also influenced by institutional change, which involves incremental development in policies based on past actions and structural adjustment in developing countries.

Experiences of welfare states in **Europe** varied across history. However, most of it concentrated on economic development to achieve a welfare state. Asa Briggs' essay on "the British welfare state" outlined three key elements: minimum standards, social protection in insecurity, and the

provision of services at the best possible level. (Briggs, Asa, 1950, Finlayson, Geoffrey, April 1994)

The **German** welfare system is based on a corporatist structure, developed by Bismarck. The post-war German settlement aimed for establishing a social state' or social market economy', prioritizing economic development for social welfare. Social services were closely linked to labor market position, with earnings-related benefits for those without a job. Public expenditure on welfare was also crucial for economic development. Social insurance covers health, social care, and income maintenance costs. The principle of "subsidiarity" emphasizes decentralization and residual state intervention, with higher earners not covered by the main social insurance system. (Pfaller, Alfred, 1997) Whereas in **France** social protection is based on the principle of solidarity, and on the French Code of Social Security. This principle refers to co-operative mutual support, equal contributions and benefits, and interdependence. The pursuit of national solidarity began with the creation of a 'régime général' for health and social security, which has since expanded to include 'insertion' or social inclusion. The Revenu Minimum d'Insertion (RMI) was introduced in 1988, emphasizing individual responsibility for unemployed people. The French welfare system focused on controlling expenditure. Concerns include pensions due to occupational group privileges and healthcare spending, where independent, market-led services pose significant cost control issues. (Chemla, Eliane, 2021). In Switzerland, the Swiss government implemented the FORJAD program of social policy (Formation Professionnelle pour les Jeunes Adultes en Difficulté) to prepare young unemployed adults between the ages of 18 and 25 for the market and to help them become self-sufficient, (Martignani, Luca, 2016) The **Swedish** welfare state offers universal minimum care to its citizens, surpassing the British model in social equality. Sweden combines comprehensive social provision with egalitarianism. The system is selective by occupational experience but emphasizes equality, sometimes associated with 'solidarity' through 'solidaristic wage policy'. (Veit-Wilson J., 2011)

The European welfare system was a result of socio-political changes in the 19th century. It was a gradual change towards establishing a welfare state where equal social provisions were combined with achieving economic development and stabilizing the labor market.

Concerning the **United States of America** though often viewed as a liberal welfare regime that is characterized by individualism, laissez-faire, and a punitive view of poverty, Central government has had a limited role in social welfare provision, with the main developments occurring during the Roosevelt administration and the "War on Poverty" of the 1960s. (Schwarz, J. E.,1990)

The United States lacks a unified welfare system, with states holding important functions like public assistance, social care, and health schemes. However, it adopts the notion of ‘welfare individualism’, which is rooted in the classical economics of Adam Smith and been revived by New Right thinkers such as Milton Friedman.

Emerging welfare states in emerging economies such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Africa, Turkey have introduced expansions and variations in social policies and social expenditures since the 90s. This was because of the roles and pressures exercised by the labor unions and partisan ideologies, who implemented a number of social programs to prevent social insecurity, provide a minimum income and living standards. (Dorlach, Tim, 2020). Dorlach proposes that the growth of overall social spending on social security, health care, and education serves as a gauge for the expansion of a welfare state. For instance, deindustrialization in Latin America resulted in rising unemployment, forcing many workers to accept risky, part-time jobs in order to make ends meet. In Turkey party policies adopted these non-contributory social policies. (Yoruk, 2022, Campello, D., 2015, Garay, C. 2016, Schmitt, C., 2020) In South Africa social movements and labor unions have been instrumental in recent South African practices aimed at reforming social policies and strengthening the welfare state. (Yuda, Ashfina, 2023)

I could be noticed that emerging economies adopted a narrow meaning of the welfare state were policies_and institutions providing health service, public education and social security are referred to and considered as “the welfare state”.

Concerning the Middle and North African countries (MENA) the authoritarian bargain characterized the provision of social services in the first ten years, but over time, many MENA governments reduced the provision aspect as well as the protection and participation aspects. MENA governments exchanged political compliance for stability and social protection. (Loewe, Markus; Albrecht, Holger, 2023) Solava Ibrahim stated

that the uprisings in Egypt between 2011 and 2013 didn't succeed in changing the social contract nor improved the well-being of the Egyptians and instilled an authoritarian regime that failed to respond to socio-economic aspirations of the Egyptians. It also led to de-legitimization of the political regime. (Ibrahim, Solava, 2021)

According to Gupta, crises calls for an expansion of the welfare state. The Covid -19 pandemic signaled the importance of the welfare state and brought it to the fore after the retreat due to the influences of neo-liberalism and globalization. The government had to play a proactive role to save people and provide for the socio-economic costs. However, no state can deal with such challenges by its own. Also, the aftermath of the Covid-19, made policy makers to recognize the need for eliminating socio-economic inequalities, which prevail in any society. It also led to a shift in paradigm from the narrow goal of economic efficiency to interdependence among socio-economic and environmental resilience. (Gupta, Asha,2022)

Here, social welfare expansion or diminishing is dependent upon if the government either assumes broader social responsibilities voluntary or driven by crises or aims at relinquishing welfare policies.

Another point of view states that the increase in social policies can be attributed, in part, to changes in the skills needed to enter the labor market and unemployment and in the lack of a strategy based on citizen rights (T.H.Marshall,1950) The recipients of welfare state social policies differ between nations and even within nations, ranging from employed to unemployed: the impoverished in rural and urban areas who receive what are known as non-contributory social security, health security, social pensions, and unemployment insurance. (Dorlach, Tim, 2020) Welfare reform policies also proposed a basic income, Dworkin suggested a range of welfare programs that policy makers could adopt to enable people to improve their well - being and control their own lives. He did not provide a definitive welfare program to solve issues like unemployment insurance for example. (Dworkin, Robert, 2004)

The basic income approach adopted by policy makers, according to Dorlach aim not to respond to the needy, but to the less-well off.

Literature has also related the growth of the welfare state to the timing of the program. They have also used differences in social policy preferences to explain the welfare state's actual developments. (Berens, S., 2015;

Menendez, I, 2018) Time -limited and high levels of social services' provisions for the poor could decrease legitimacy, because sometime the poor will find themselves relying on themselves, due to the state commitment in supporting the private sector and the market and its accompanied inequalities. (Austin, Regina, 1982)

Social policy reforms in the context of a market economy were influenced by international organizations by the beginning of the 21st century when donor agencies asked for certain changes to counterbalance the economic liberalization policies that support neoliberal policies such as IMF, WB, WTO. (Holden, Christopher, 2016)

Such policies have influences most of the least developed countries, Egypt among them, who found themselves caught between responding to citizens in need and transforming towards a liberal market economy.

Part two: Theoretical and conceptual framework

One of the theoretical frameworks that have been identified to dominate the literature explaining the growth of social policy reform is Durkheim's structural-functional theory which believes that social issues like unfair labor contracts, unstable wages, and unemployment were caused by the market expansion and economic growth in industrialized societies. Other welfare theoretical frameworks discuss power relations theory, resource theory, which calls for public spending and the most efficient use of productive resources. Also, Marx's theories of the state imply a mutually beneficial relationship between the state apparatus and the ruling class that might affect the provision of social benefits to the exploited. (Offe, Claus, 1984)

The welfare theory also concentrates on welfare institutions and what they provide. The provision of social provisions alone does not account for the existence of a welfare state. (Goodin, Robert E., 1988:3-6) Approaching the welfare state could be from a poor-law state in the sense that state institutions, which are considered ethical agents, should be guided by legal duty when providing the needy persons with the resources.

Esping stated other categories of welfare theories that have dominated the research of welfare theories: state-centered or institutional theories, and theories that highlight the importance of politics, particularly party politics, and structural or functional theories. (Andersen, Gosta -Esping, 1990: 13, Pierson, 1991) Party politics shape social policies and determine how much

money is spent on welfare programs. Regarding state-centered or institutional theories, it explains the role of the nation-state as the only entity capable of implementing welfare programs to make up for the risks and weaknesses associated with market distributiveness. (Andersen, Gosta -Epsing, 1990: 15).

Another theoretical aspect that explains the expansion of the welfare state is the “the crises -driven welfare state”, which relates the difficulties and the crisis that states face as a result of economic globalization and neo-liberalism in the 1970s and 80s and governments concentrating on the social and political context of welfare policies. (Holden, Christopher, 2014: 32) Thus, one could conclude that economic globalization led also to the growth of social policies.

Social policies are also linked to theories of political legitimacy from both the input and output sides of the political system. Social services’ provision is important for the survival of any political regime. Policy outcomes demonstrate the relationship between serving individuals’ interests and political legitimacy (Calizada, Ines, 2012 :41), which include beneficiary expectations, political values, and socioeconomic settings. Accordingly, the majority of governments have reformed the socioeconomic structure in accordance with welfarism, both morally and politically. (Matti, S., 2009: 3)

The study uses the legitimacy theory to analyze welfare policies in Egypt. The theory states that social policies are prioritized, because the legitimacy of the state in the future may be determined by social policies. The theory also discusses to what extent can social policies strengthen or weaken state legitimacy. This has to do with how the state views welfare expansion and how it manifests itself in political organizations like legislatures and political parties. It is also related to how the state employs ideology to increase social spending and the welfare state. Despite what the Egyptian case study illustrates in the 60s, the current political regime has increased its social spending in the absence of left-wing governments.

Conceptual Framework

I suppose the obvious place from which to begin discussing the relationship between welfare state and legitimacy in Egypt is to discuss what counts as ‘welfarism and legitimacy.

The concept of "welfare" refers to happiness, prosperity, and general well-being; it includes not only physical survival but also a certain level of

health and contentment. Because of this, "general well-being" is a politically acceptable ideal that is practically universally acknowledged.

What gives the concept of welfare its importance is that it has come to be associated with a specific method of achieving general well-being: collectively provided welfare, delivered by government through what is known as the "welfare state. (Heywood, Chin, 2023:217)

During the 19th and the 20th century, the "welfare state" flourished in liberal democratic societies and was coined to refer to the government's expanded social duties. Therefore, welfare is also related with concepts of "Social welfare" which reflects the welfare principle. Adam Smith examined also "welfare individualism" which has its origins in Smith's classical economics and his work on the "Theory of Moral Sentiments" and has been partly applied by neoliberal political and economic thinkers like Hayek and Friedman. (Coker, Edward W.,1990:140)

There have been attempts to formulate a welfare thinking "third way" to strike a balance between individualism and collectivism by acknowledging that citizens have moral obligations as well as welfare rights.

One of the "welfare state" goals and justifications is to advance social cohesion through institutions and policies that carry out the welfare goal. Therefore, "the welfare state" is frequently used to refer to a group of institutions including the health care system, social security system, and public education system. This makes the welfare state with less or more social responsibilities. It could be an attempt to either complement or, in certain situations, take the place of a private provision system or the market that cannot or will not adequately provide, such as housing, health care, education, pensions, and benefits. This type of welfare state was developed in the UK during the postwar era, based on the Beveridge Report in 1942 (Beveridge, William,1942), and was later embraced by most of Western Europe. Welfarism is impacted by everything the government does, including taxation, national security, healthcare, education policies, and its inability to meet basic human needs.

Another welfare justification is to consolidate economic interests. No matter how strong the capitalists' influence is, the state is called upon to serve the interests of other classes.

Welfarism is also justified to combat poverty, which is a concern of all welfare policies. Poverty, on the surface, is defined as lacking the

"necessities of life," such as enough clothing, food, and fuel to maintain "physical efficiency. The primary aim of welfare states is the elimination of poverty." Governments provide food, healthcare, social insurance, and public assistance programs in an effort to help the less fortunate and those in need. This is covered by social policies, also known as welfare policies. Social policies have their origins in the liberal democracies that emerged after World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt-introduced "New Deal" program of the 1930s, and the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, all of which provided justification for significant political action in the form of social policies. (DiNitto, Johnson, 2021)

Another justification of the existence of a welfare state according to T.H. Marshall is achieving social citizenship. It refers to the equality of all social rights, including property rights. In order to fulfill social rights, the state must interact with the market and the roles that families play in society. Social assistance, as a manifestation of social rights, does not completely free an individual from market dependency. (Lister, Michael, 2005:476) In this context one can distinguish within the welfare state between formal citizenship and social citizenship. For example, the uneven treatment between Mexicans and European immigrants in the United States explains the division between social and formal citizenship and the impact of local control on the relief assistance on both social groups. The welfare state should have addressed both. (Fox, Cybelle, 2012:285-286, Goodin, R. 1988:264)

Social policies have affected the relationship between the welfare state and the market economy and raised many concerns. In this context, the welfare state is not in conflict with the market economy. But it assists in regulating its practices and plans by the prevention of its negative outcomes on the needy due to the market forces' mechanisms. (Briggs, 1961:228) Its role could be considered a corrective and re-distributive role. This role differs from a planned economy where the state intervenes from the beginning and decides how the market should act, which is perceived as violating free market economy. (Holden, Christopher, 2020, :3)

The study adopts a welfare approach that aims at achieving self-reliance of the individual. This is what the state with other social classes owe to those in need. (Goodin, 1988, p.332). It also adopts Dorlach's definition of the welfare state which concentrates on empowering the needy through equalizing everyone's share of productive resources rather than consumption

resources and social goods. The welfare state role is to reduce inequalities and not to eliminate it, because it would not be possible. A welfare state limits its provisions of social needs to the minimum and leave a space for individual freedom to choose the way of reducing the inequalities.

A welfare state should strive to readjust the pattern of final distribution rather than interfering in how one uses his own property rights in productive resources or confiscating productive resources to limit inequalities or mandating a specific policy to relieve stress and perceive it as the only successful policy. (Dorlach, Tim, 2020:774-75)

Legitimacy is also related to welfare through promoting social justice. Promoting social justice tends to decrease social inequalities and foster social cohesion, improve the social and economic status of the individuals, which are some of the advantages that come along with introducing welfarism. It legitimizes welfare policies when they are developed in close relation with citizens' political, civil, social and economic rights according to the standard prevailing in society. (Marshall, T., 1950:2-5, Korpi, Walter, 2006: 88)

In "The Social Contract ([1762] 1969), J.J.Rousseau wrote that "*The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty,*" The simplest definition of legitimacy is "rightfulness. "Legitimacy is not in contrast with power. Legitimacy theory seeks to provide an answer to the crucial question of when and under what circumstances is government legitimate. The government can only exist if it enjoys legitimacy. Legitimacy turns unregulated power into legitimate authority; it gives a directive or command a binding or authoritative quality, guaranteeing that people obey it out of duty rather than out of fear. (Heywood, Andrew, 2004:144). Conversely, Aristotle maintained that the legitimacy of rule stemmed from its moral purpose and could only be served by it when it served the interests of the entire community rather than the rulers' personal gain. (Rosler, Andres, 2005) On the other hand, Jeremy Bentham outlined three requirements for the legitimacy of power: it must be exercised in accordance with laws and norms, the governed must consent to the power being used against them, and the governor and the governed must hold similar values. (Vitali, James, 2021:265). Legitimacy, according to Max Weber, is defined as the "belief in the right to rule," assuming that the subjects of the ruler would submit to them. People adhere to the existing social order when they share a set of norms and beliefs. (Weber, Max, 1924: 31) Johnson

and Dowd consider legitimacy as a social process and termed it as “social legitimacy”. They applied two approaches regarding social legitimacy: the first approach is social psychological that focuses on the legitimacy of organizational authority, while the second approach is institutional and focuses on the legitimacy of organizational practices. (Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway, 2006: 53-54) Therefore, legitimization could involve encouraging individuals to accept particular social policies and practices, that help in legitimizing the status quo.

Legitimacy also benefits from a legal- rational framework in which it operates. Authority gains legitimacy according to the individual expectation from this authority to contribute to the welfare of the individual and fulfill his needs effectively. (Offe, Claus:134-35)

The relationship between the welfare state and legitimacy could be examined through the integration process and how many achieved a good standard of living by benefiting from education, healthcare, employment and security, and to what extent are welfare programs accessible and sustainable. (Korpi, 1998: 671)

Part three: The formation and transformation of welfare provisions in Egypt, the continuity and change in the welfare systems

The discussion and analysis of the welfare state in Egypt – like many countries in the Global South and in the North- is caught between left and right arguments, between rolling back the frontiers of the state and allowing for the least of services provided for the needy by the state to defend their position ethically for an equal and fair distribution of resources. The conceptualization of the welfare state in Egypt requires examining the types of welfarism and its motivation through policy orientations pre-2013.

This part examines the main welfare systems in Egypt since its independence and the reasons for restructuring social services. The examination applies concepts of de- commodification and de- stratification by Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen, G.,1996)

a- Welfare system in Egypt pre-independence

Social services were provided during the 19th century through Islamic and Christian religious charities. These charities existed during the formation of the Egyptian modern state in 1840s and during the British occupation to Egypt in 1882. The first associations that responded to the social and

economic needs of the Egyptians were The Association of Islamic Benevolence which was formed in 1878, followed by the establishment of the Coptic association in 1891. Charities, Zakat and Waqf were the only existing organizations that could create social solidarity during occupation and provide social services for the poor and for the middle class. Ethnic and Islamic grass- roots social services were the most known one. The latter covered most of the welfare services like clinics, schools, day-care centers and banks. Its aim was to compensate for the absence of a nation-state and to encourage individual charity and not necessarily to spread Political Islam. It represented social Islam more than political Islam. Muslims benefited mostly from these social welfare institutions. By the beginning of the 20th century the numbers of religious and ethnic associations reached more than 100 and exceeded to 1000 association after the Second World War. (Clark, Janine A. 1995:12,13) In 1854 the first pension program was introduced by the ruling government and covered only civil servants and military officers. (El-Meehy, 2009:760)

Although this period was more characterized as a welfare society, it could not be argued that the charities de-legitimized the social role of the state, nor did it fill the gap of the absence of state services. This was evident when the state has introduced in 1940 for the first time a food subsidies program and complemented it by the year 1950 with benefits for widowed women under 65, elderly, orphans and disabled persons between 17-65. Concerning the type and geographic distribution of these associations, Islamic associations until the 60s outnumbered the ethnic associations and were concentrated in rural areas. Most of it were registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs. They have provided cheap social, educational and health services through donations and local funding. “Mustafa Mahmoud Network Clinics” are one of the main private “Islamic” health clinics that exists until now. However, most of the clinics provide health services to the communities they work in without necessarily a religious affiliation. (Zubaida, Sami,1992: 9)

b- Welfare system in post-independence Egypt (1952-1970)

Social services provision in post- colonial Egypt was characterized by solidarity approaches and ethical responsibility and state capitalism. The emphasis was on putting a legal framework that defines accessibility to social services. The main demonstration for social justice and citizens’ empowerment during Nasser’s regime was the introduction of the Land Reform Laws in 1952 to grant 5 feddans for each peasant and the proliferation

of state led political and economic institutions and the state policies in adopting a comprehensive welfare policy towards the Egyptian citizens to bridge class gaps. Other literature mention that the Land Reform Law aimed at directing investments to agriculture, mining and industrial enterprises controlled by the state. (Goldberg, Ellis, Beinin, Joel, 2020:216-20)

Guaranteed employment in the public sector and the provision of social insurance in the 60s and 70s for university graduates was another manifestation of achieving social justice. It could be argued that the public institutions had the capacity to relatively absorb job seekers and unemployment versus the population growth rates in 1955 (23 M), 1960 (27 M), 1965 (30 M), 1970 (34M) (PopulationPyramid.net). Nasser followed a non- capitalist path of development through merging state capitalism with the needs of the deprived class. State capital was inherited from the pre-revolution industrial capitalist sector and landlords which was confiscated and nationalized by the ruling Free Officers. The principal socio-economic objective of Nasser's regime, as written in the 1962 Charter of National Action was "to raise both consumption and investment at the same time." (Abdel-Fadil, Mahmoud, 1980). The role of the state was manifested in the increase of state expenditures which accounted for 54% of the GDP, 70% of total investment and 40% of total employment. Total public expenditures increased by 40% from 1952 (20% of GDP) to 60% in 1981. (Sadiq, Ahmed, 1984:1) The introduction of socialist policies led to aligning the impoverished workers and the poor with Nasser's regime through social services provisions like health care, free education, social insurance, pensions and unemployment compensations like that of Suez Canal workers had received after 1967 war.

Though the former, this didn't mean that the state earned a full legitimacy and recognition for its social policies, due to a distortion in the labor – government dynamics. In 1953 two textile workers were sentenced to death, because they demonstrated against the Free Officers economic policies. (ElSayed, Ahmed, 2018:2). Nasser, through his social policies driven by state -owned capital created different rent-seeking actors with different nature and without power such as the poor.

c- Welfare system during Anwar Sadat (1971-1980)

The introduction of liberalization and democratization policies during Sadat's regime from 1971-1980 marked a departure from socialism. It could not be said that there existed a liberal- type of welfare state where the state

focuses on the less-well off and work status. The main aim of the implementation of the “open door policy “Infitah” was to integrate the Egyptian state into the world market and to improve the public sector to work with a market bourgeoisie private sector type, which resulted in a distortion of income distribution. (Goldberg, Eillis, Beinin, Joel,1982). The government, then, adopted a program titled “The Plan of the Economic Crossing,” to attract and benefit from Western experiences and Arab capital and to improve both the private and public sector like what happened in South Korea. The opposition to new policies culminated after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) demanded to end state subsidies on foods and basic necessities as a condition of new loans, which resulted in a rise in food prices and an uprising all over the republic in 1977. These developments forced the regime to restore subsidies. Different social sectors showed fear and discontent of the new economic policies, especially the workers and state bureaucracy. Between 1971-1975, several incidents occurred in “Helwan Steel Complex “and also at “Abu Kabir” and further incidents at the factories of “Shubra al-Khayma” and demonstrations of the Public Transportation Workers”. (Aulas, Marie-Christine,1982,). It could be observed that Sadat’s regime failed in abandoning Nasser’s welfare state type and confronted difficulties to introduce a conservative- liberal- welfare state type and developed instead a rentier state by expanding the national market for imports and depending on its natural resources (Suez Canal) for its revenues. The food imports amounted for 4.4 b\$ annually by 1981. The five years plan from 1978-1981 marked the return of the social role of the state and de-stratification policies by targeting low-income citizens and malnutrition. (Ikram, Khaled,1981:30) For example the amount of imported wheat increased from 3026- 4300 tons during the period 1976-1981, and the amount of oil for the same period raised from 222- 375 ton. (Sadiq, Ahmed, 1984: 51-52)

It is worth noting that some social strata benefited from “Infitah” policies like doctors, teachers, merchants, but workers. Peasants and state employees were affected negatively due to the ideological and economic foreign involvement in the economy by demanding the removal of price subsidies and devaluating the currency as a condition to receive foreign aid. Many of the negatively affected social sectors migrated to Gulf countries. (Birks,S., Sinclair, 1980:221). The state during Sadat’s rule did not fulfill its

social role promises and the provision of social services was partly left to the family sector through remittances and to Muslim religious grass root organizations. The spending on subsidies witnessed a slight increase of total expenditures from 1976- 1981. In 1976 (3280 M. LE) 13% to 13.8% (14494 M. LE) in 1982. (Mohamed, Ahmed Ezz Eldin, 2018:71) The welfare state model during Sadat's rule could be characterized as a model of foreign influence and apparent involvement of social sectors to provide social services. The political regime sought to draw its legitimacy from outside particularly foreign donors and not from the inside. The warfare and external threats legitimized the weak social policies that were introduced during Sadat's regime. Sadat did not have a political desirability to increase social spending.

d- Welfare system during Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011)

The socio-economic reforms during Mubarak's rule which lasted for thirty years, could be characterized by three generations 'reforms, namely from 1991-1998 and from 1998-2004 and from 2004-2010. The state continued to subsidize food and energy with 10% of the GDP. GDP growth rates increased from an average of 4.3% in the 1990s to around 5.6% in the 2000s, while inflation rates decreased from double digits to around 7% during the same period. De-commodification included subsidies for bread, oil and sugar to be 59%, 47%, 56%, and 62%, respectively during the period 1996-1997 for the majority of the Egyptian citizens, which continued to be procured by imports. (Alissa, Sufyan, 2007:2-6)

Regarding the health care services during the period 1995-1997, there were class disparities regarding health services. The richest quintile received 24% of the public expenditure on health care compared to 16.3% for the poor. The misallocation of resources was reflected in 56% spending on curative diseases over communicative diseases which is widely spread. Also, the health assurance coverage reached only 35% of the citizens by 1995 and increased only to 55% of the citizens in 2008, though the immunization coverage reached 93% of the total citizens. Until 2004, the state had 78 social programs that invested in early childhood nurseries, centers for rural children, libraries and youth clubs. (Mohamed, Ahmed Ezz Eldin, 2018:75,76)

The pension system during the period 2004-2005 covered about 93% of the formally employed workers and 7.5 million pensioners and their eligible survivors in the public sector and private sector employers, self-

employed workers and casual workers according to the law 112/1980. In addition to the state contribution, 40% of individual workers contribute to covering healthcare and other social programs. The contribution of casual workers according to the previous law is 1 L.E. per month in return for receiving a monthly pension of 80 L.E. The pension system put conditions for eligible beneficiaries such as 10 years of work on a basic salary and 20 years of work on a variable salary and certain health and family conditions. Those conditions resulted in excluding informal workers in the agricultural and construction sectors, who constituted 9 million of the eligible workers. Women made 20% of the informal workers without a legal contract, which meant that they are out of the pension system. (Mohamed, Ahmed Ezz Eldin, 2018:73) During this period, Egypt's poverty line was estimated to be between 953-1097 LE annually (79-91 LE per month), and the monthly benefit provided by the government was well below this poverty line. (World Bank, 2002).

In 2004 a new government ruled and was characterized by neo-liberal political consensus driven by providing legitimacy not only for state policies but for crony capitalism rule. Its rule was marked by businesses success in building strong connections with government authorities, which granted them distribution of legal permits, government grants, special tax breaks, or other forms of state interventionism. Politically connected businesses elites worked on securing their business and their products as well as the sectors they operate in. Well-connected businessmen with ties to the ruling elite in Egypt exerted significant influence over the official private sector. (Loewe, M., 2013) They managed to establish dominance over protection and subsidies, enabling them to expand their market shares in comparison to their competitors. Ismail Sabry's study revealed that politically connected firms within a sector had adverse effects on overall growth, resulting in a reduction in the number of medium and large companies and workers' layoffs. During the last decade of Mubarak's rule and due to fragile institutions, young economic experts and ambitious businessmen, played an important role through crony networks in reshaping the country's political and economic vision through privatization, trade reforms, and financial sector re-capitalization in 2005. In a short period, the new government managed to privatize 87 state-owned enterprises, a significant difference from the previous annual average of 21 companies between 1994 and 2004. The

earnings from privatizations also experienced a substantial increase, jumping from an average of EGP 1.7 billion to EGP 15.1 billion in 2005. (Sabry, M. I.,2019)

During 2005-2010 rising conflict of interest of businessmen who had held influential positions in government, the ruling party, parliament, and various influential boards and committees was apparent. Politically connected sectors received higher non-tariff protection, particularly post-tariff liberalization in the 2000s. Additionally, commodity subsidies were notably reduced for the first time since Nasser's rule, leading to significant price surges, including a 50% increase in petrol, a 19% rise in electricity, and a 100% surge in water prices, contributing to an 18% consumer price inflation in 2008. (Malik, A., Eibl, F., 2018, February 6). The neoliberal model was not aligned with creating an active citizen model and self – reliance.

From 2000-2010, Egypt's social safety net programs (SSN) included fuel subsidies, food (mainly bread) subsidies, and a limited cash transfer program known as Social Solidarity Pension. (World Bank,2005). Until 2010, the formal social services' provisions was also accompanied - like during Sadat's rule- with an informal social welfare programs from religious institutions, extended families and family networks in poor rural areas that expressed social solidarity and ethical responsibility. Families secured commodities, money, employment. Muslim and Christian religious institutions continued to be essential recourses to fund education and health care through "Zakat" and Islamic endowment "Waqf". By the year 2000 the religious institutions constituted for about 35% of non- profit organizations in Egypt and managed to provide social protection and social services for two million Egyptian families where poverty rates reached 25% in 2010. (Pioppi, Daniela, 2004:4 – 6)

Though the exerted efforts in improving social stratification geographically and socially unequal distribution of social benefits existed, and the poor received only 16% of the social benefits versus the richest quintile who has access to subsidized fuel and food by 28%. (Mohamed, Ahmed Ezz Eldin, 2018:73).

The welfare provisions that went hand in hand with the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Program during Mubarak regime failed to reach the poor sectors who did not benefit either from economic liberalization policies nor from social services either because of poor targeting policies or the

change in the political and economic directions. Household expenditure surveys in 1996 showed a decline in per capita consumption in urban and rural areas by 42%. (El Sayed, Ahmed, 2018:5), Also, the labour law No112/2003 and its amendments by the law No180/2008 has threatened job security and the state's commitment to employ higher-education graduates. (<https://manshurat.org/node/63713>)

Though the rising role of the private sector it failed to absorb the number of needed jobs and new entrants to the labor market, which forced the state to employ new entrants into its public institutions and government organizations. (Springborg, Robert, 2017:188) Also, though the adoption of neo liberal policies, the state spent more on subsidies, most notably on energy, which caused a budget deficit of 7-8 % during Mubarak's final rule. (World Bank, 2016)

The main political actors who contributed to designing welfare policies during Mubarak's regime were the bureaucracy's power, resources, and the state alliances that restructured the subsidy plan and social programs. (World Bank Group, 2015)

The slogans of the 2011 revolution "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and Human Dignity" reflected those disparities and ill-planned and weak targeted social services and the unfilled aspirations in equality of opportunities and wealth distribution. The subsequent political regime wished to respond to the "bread, freedom, social justice and dignity" demands and consolidate its legitimacy through the expansion of social services provisions and expenditures.

e- Welfare system during Abdel Fattah El Sisi (2014-2023)

The political regime under president El Sisi started in 2014 its own welfare programs that were demanded and monitored by the Presidency himself. The launched programs departed from the pre- 2014 welfare programs only in name and created a parallel path of social services' provisions in addition to what has been existing such as "Daman" pension.

The first program introduced by the president was "Takaful and Karama" meaning "Solidarity and Dignity" program (TKP). The program was designed to compensate for the negative outcomes of the economic reform programs on poor families. The solidarity program "Takaful" aims at alleviating poverty and is influenced by similar programs implemented in Brazil and Mexico. The program operates through a cash transfer mechanism

that target poor families with an income support conditioned that they have children (0-18) enrolled in schools for up to 3 children per family (decreased to 2 children in 2019), and that they receive medical examination for 4 years. In most cases, the female household receives the income. TKP aims at increasing food consumption and reducing the poverty of poor families, thus improving targeting policies. The second part of TKP program is “Karama” (Dignity). It is an unconditional program and aims is at providing social protection to vulnerable poor elderly people (aged 65 years and above), and poor people living with disabilities who cannot work. The program also included widows and orphans (0-18 years) who are living with extended family members. TKP included compiling information about poor families that accounted for 35 million individuals, which is approximately 5.2 million families, which constitute 20% of those living in poverty and is constantly expanding as indicated in the Ministry of Social Solidarity social registry. The project’s life was until 2023. (State Information Service,2021)

The state provision of food subsidies, cash transfer and basic services at low prices came out of the fear of political instability and its struggle to compensate for economic structural reforms socio-economic inequalities and indirectly responding to the 2011 demand calling for “Human Dignity”.

The former presidential initiatives could not be characterized as state welfare initiatives. The state could not claim ownership of these initiatives, because it contributed only with 67.4 million US\$ from the Ministry of Finance to fund the first round of TKP from the remaining budget of the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS). The main program fund came from the World Bank in a 3 -year loan of 400 million US\$ (World Bank, 2015) to assist in alleviating poverty, and guarantee an efficient implementation of TKP. The state received additional funds from the Programmatic Technical Assistance on Social Safety Nets, and from the Middle East and North Africa Transition Fund, including a US\$2.0 million of a US\$6.5 million grant for designing the developing the targeting methodology, and launching the Universal National Registry (UNR). Also, the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) provided additional technical support in, 2019). In addition to the former, the World Bank provided an operational grant of USD 25 million for operational costs of consultants, training of social local units and procurement of tablets. Also, UNICEF contributed with 20,000 USD to support TKP

during its initial phase. (Amr Abdel Hafez, Mai, Adel, Shaimaa, Moharram,2019)

The authority that manages and supervises TKP lies with the President, and contributions to “Tahia Misr “fund (Long Live Egypt Fund) are received through a designated account that is under his direct supervision. (Tahia Misr Fund)

TKP was also funded from the outcome of a five years plan to phase out energy subsidies, which resulted in the cut in fuel subsidy bill from 18bn US\$ in 2014 to 10bn US\$ in 2015. These reforms resulted in the increase of fuel prices. Octane 80 and 92 prices rose by 77 and 41 percent, respectively, Diesel price rose by 64 percent and natural gas prices rose by 175 percent in 2014.

In 2020, the United Kingdom has contributed with 2.2 million US\$, and another contribution of 180.000US\$ was channeled to the World Bank by the Partnership for Economic Inclusion (PEI). Also, the Nordic Trust Fund provided a grant of 212,500 US\$ to TKB. (World Bank,2021)

The TKP program has cost 17 billion EGP in 2022. The program's projected cost for 2023 was estimated by 28 billion EGP. It is true that financing TKP increased in nominal terms, but it decreased as a percentage of GDP to 0.21% in 2019. After the World Bank loan has ended, the government stepped into financing TKP. To ensure effective targeting and outcome, the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) has established 2,226 Social Accountability Committees (SACs) in 24 Governorates. (World Bank,2019) This step helped in consolidating the legitimacy of the program.

TKP has expanded in 2019 by granting a second financial support from the World Bank that amounted to 500 million US\$ for three more years. This expansion under an additional program titled “FORSA” meaning “Opportunity” is to enable an exit from the cash transfer program TKP and move to wage and self -employment. It is considered an economic empowerment and an economic inclusion program, especially during times of economic crises. (El Shabrawy, Atef, Gilligan, Kurdi, 2022; Egypt Youth Employment (EYE): Economic Empowerment under FORSA Programme, ILO, 2023)

Another welfare program was announced by the President during the National Youth Conference in 2019 titled “*Hayat Karima*” meaning a “Dignified or Decent Life”. The initiative was launched in the framework of

Egypt Development Sustainable Plan 2030. More than 20 ministries and 23 civil society organizations participated in the initiative. (Presidency Initiative” Haya Karima”)

The government of Egypt allocated 500 billion to develop 4500 villages in the first phase, 65% of it are in Upper Egypt. (Egypt Today, 18 Jul.2023)

The aim of the project is to bridge the gap between urban and rural areas. The initiative was divided into direct and indirect interventions. The initiative provides direct and indirect interventions. Direct interventions included developing infrastructure like housing, water and sanitations, training and employment and childhood development. Indirect interventions included health services, subsidized food and environmental services like waste management. (UNDP, Sustainable Rural Communities, Decent Life “Haya Kareema”)

One of the main projects goals is to provide 124 thousand suitable housing the value of directed investments of EGP 20.6 billion including integrating the people of Sinai by allocating 89.3 million pounds for that purpose. (Egypt Today,2 Jan.2023)

According to the World Bank estimates (World Bank,2022), Egypt's main social affairs programs could only lift 6.5% of the population out of poverty in 2019/2020. The largest reduction in poverty was attributed to food subsidies and cash transfer programs. However, poverty rate was estimated according to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), at 29.7% for the 2019/2020 period. It is estimated that due to continued economic reforms it could rise to 33% in 2023. (Al-Shawarby, S., El-Laithy, H.,2022). From 2013-2023, social services’ provision was fragmented between several ministries: Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS) and the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade (MoSIT), Ministry of Endowment, Ministry of Interior, and Nasser Social Bank and the Presidential initiatives that are financed from a special fund (Tahia Misr Fund).

Other state initiatives were launched within the framework of activating the social role of the security authorities and monitoring prices and markets.

The Ministry of Interior launched several initiatives in 2019. The initiatives are comprised of 23 phases until 2023. The first initiative titled "*Aman*" meaning “Feeling Secure” in collaboration with the General

Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry in the governorates. The aim of the initiative is to contribute to decreasing commodity prices by 30% and monitoring markets and facilitate the interaction of commercial chains to provide goods. “Aman” offers food commodities sacrificial meat and preventive medical supplies through its 665 fixed and mobile outlets nationwide. The initiative was accepted by the public and praised from citizens, especially those with low income. (State Information Service, 2022)

The Ministry of Interior launched another initiative also in 2019 titled ***"We are all one"*** for school supplies and tools. Several meetings were held in collaboration with major commercial shop branches and producers and manufacturers of school uniforms and owners of major bookstores, to provide necessary school requirements (school uniforms - school tools) with high quality and lower prices than similar ones in the market at a rate of up to 30%. The initiative displayed its commodities through fixed 276 outlets, mobile cars, exhibitions, sheds) in all governorates at the level of the Republic. (Ministry of Interior, Marketsandbranches,2022)

The former programs did not introduce a new philosophy nor set a new context for a different welfare state type. It has only moved policy settings and oversight from the concerned ministries to the President.

Also, a decline in public expenditure of the GDP was apparent from 33% to 22.2% during the period 2014-2022 despite nominal increases in subsidies, grants and social benefits from 150 to 385 billion L.E during the same period. (The Global Economy, Egypt, government expenditure) Statista, Egypt, government expenditure). And during a conference titled "Story of a Nation" Hekayet Watan, President Sisi requested an increase in social spending from 1,75 BL.E. to 2.5BL.E. (Hekayet Watan Conference, 2023)

It is argued according to Clarke that the citizens accepted the “bitter pill” referring to the harsh and rapid economic reforms due to a successful government led public relations campaign. (Clarke, K. (2014). Energy subsidy country update: Assessing Egypt’s energy subsidy reforms. (Geneva, IISD-GSI,2014,)

This did not prove to be true, due to the existence of a repeated political discourse on the threat of delving into political instabilities like neighboring Arab countries if citizens refuse the economic reform, in addition

to repressive state against opposing policies largely contributed to forcefully accepting these reforms.

The new political regime under Abdel Fatah Al Sisi continued de-stratification policies motivated by continued rise in poverty rates that reached 26,3% of the population, poor targeting, poor institutional arrangements, budget deficits and its impact on sustaining a welfare state. The government continued to show a tendency in shifting from in-kind subsidies to conditional cash transfers. The type of welfare state was advocated by an authoritarian regime and not driven by citizens' rights regardless of needs and working conditions, but for cementing the regime's stability over budget and economic constraints. This has been manifested in comparison between the increase or decrease of social expenditures as a percentage of GDP or from social contributions.

Thus, the transformation of the welfare system in Egypt did not follow a liberal nor a conservative nor a social democratic model. This understanding reveals a lack in philosophy of a welfare state in Egypt. De-stratification overwhelmed de-commodification policies. The state intervened since 1999 in what it thinks as an economic liberal context to save citizens and families who could not sustain a minimum living standard. In that, it has strived to combine both economic liberalization policies along with subsidiary policies. It has been an authoritative social welfare type that has led to a distorted welfare system that is not to be compared to either a liberal democratic or a socialist welfare state system, and which undermined the narrative of achieving social justice and human dignity due to low benefits, limited coverage and high dependency ratios on international organizations and non-voluntary contributions.

Part four: Questionnaire results and analysis

The questionnaire used in this survey is constructed to fulfill several purposes. Firstly, to follow up on some of the questions posed in previous surveys. Secondly, to capture both attitudes and opinions about more specific areas within the welfare political area, particularly the legitimacy of the political regime. Thirdly, to analyze the understanding of different aspects of the welfare politics and its relation to legitimacy. Fourthly, to investigate how the welfare state should be financed.

The questionnaire is comprised of 21 closed questions. The unit of analysis is the individual: here decision makers. The respondents aged from

30-60+. The sampling procedure was targeting policy and decision makers of social and economic policies, in addition to politicians. The survey was sent to 100 policy and decision makers. The number who responded was 57. The respondents were 57.9% males and 42.1% females. The time period investigated is ten years covering the period from 2014-2023. The data structure is numeric. The questionnaire concentrated on two variables, social policies and legitimacy. It is a self-administered questionnaire.

The questionnaire required from the respondents to answer questions on their socio-economic background, their gender, age, educational background occupation, and political and union affiliation.

About 52.6% are members in unions, and 65% are members in civil society associations, and only 22.8% are affiliated to political parties.

Respondents had to give their opinion on how they understand and define the welfare state, the public expenses and the provisions of social services, which institutions should finance education, medical service, childcare and care of the elderly. Furthermore, the respondents had to state how to distribute the responsibility for financing social insurances between the public sector, and private sector and voluntary organizations; how common they believe it to be that social security benefits and social care services are fairly distributed and if it is misused for achieving political gains. The questionnaire also includes questions on the efficiency of the public sector to manage and maintain different services. Respondents also had to report their own as well as their family's and friends' experiences on the effectiveness of the provision of social services.

Other questions dealt with the respondents' opinions on how social services should be financed, and their opinion on public expenses and social services and if they want an increase in tax money spent on social services, or to decrease it or to keep it unchanged.

The respondents had also to examine the relationship between social services' provisions and legitimacy. It also includes questions related to the impact of the provision of social services on achieving social stability.

1- Respondents knowledge of the meaning of a welfare state and its characteristics

Concerning the respondents' definition of welfarism, 70.2% defined it as social justice, while 52.6% saw it as the provision of social services,

The Paradoxes of the Welfare State in Egypt: Constructing a Welfare State through Legitimacy

غادة علي موسى

38.6% defined welfarism as the individual well-being and 40% saw that welfarism is achieving happiness for the individuals.




Figure (1): distribution of the respondents according to their definition of welfarism

Concerning who is eligible to receive social services, 51% of the respondents saw that all the Egyptians should receive social services, which reflects their awareness of the relationship between welfarism and social justice and correlates with the respondents definition of welfarism as “social justice” system, while 35% saw that only the poor are eligible to get social services.




Figure (2): distribution of the respondents according to their opinion on who is eligible to receive social services

Also, 82.5% of the respondents thought that any increase in wages should not deprive citizens from their right to receive social services, which correlate with their understanding that welfarism aims at achieving social justice.




Figure (3): distribution of the respondents according to whether an increase in wages eliminates the right to receive social services

The characteristics of the welfare state according to the respondents' answers were equally distributed among the provision of food, education, healthcare, childcare, elders 'care, social and health insurance, employment, social services and handicap care. The former reveals a narrow understanding of welfare state role as only spending on social services.

The institutional framework that is currently responsible for the provision of social services are the voluntary associations by 82.5% and then the Ministry of Social Solidarity by 77.2%. Also, 35% of the respondents thought that the private sector provides social services. The respondents also perceive that the Ministries of Education and of Health provide social services. These responses correlate with their opinion about which institutions should be responsible for financing social services in the future: 84.2% of the respondents think that it is the responsibility of the civil society associations, while 82.5% think that this should be the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Solidarity. Also, 57.9% of the respondents thought that the private sector could also be responsible for the provision of social services, which means a deviation from socialist policies that were implemented during the

political regimes from 1952-2011 and from nationalist policies that have been implemented since 2014.




Figure (4): distribution of the respondents according to their opinion about the institutions that currently provide social services

Concerning social welfare policies, 80.7% of the respondents replied that there is a need to reconsider improving tax policies for a better provision of social services. This could be attained through the need to change the type of taxes (53.1%) or to reduce taxes (34.7%).




Figure (5): distribution of the respondents according to their opinion about the tax policy to be adopted.

When respondents were asked to reflect on how much should the state spend on social services, 65% of the respondents said it should spend 25% of the GDP on social services, while 24.6% said that the state should spend 30%

of the GDP, which could reflect an understanding of the importance of an active citizenship through the individual’s responsibility to provide for his own needs.




Figure (6): distribution of the respondents according to the percentage of the gross domestic product the state must spend on social services

2- 2-Characteristics of the welfare programs (provision of social services) and its correlation with legitimacy

Social justice is a manifestation of legitimacy. 66.7% of the respondents think that social justice could be realized through the provision of social services.




Figure (7): distribution of the respondents according to whether the provision of social services leads to social justice or not

Citizens – according to the respondents- need social services to compensate for the low wages (82.5%) and to make citizens secure. (68.4%).

The Paradoxes of the Welfare State in Egypt: Constructing a Welfare State through Legitimacy

غادة علي موسى

Also, the provision of social services makes the citizens accept the political regime according to 91.2% of the respondents, because it indicates that the state cares for the citizens as indicated by 82.5% of the respondents and that he gets something in return for paying taxes as thought by 66.7% of the respondents.




Figure (8): distribution of the respondents according to the reasons why Egyptians are interested in receiving social services

It is worth noting that 36 of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree that there is a relationship between the provision and satisfaction with the social services (Q14) and the stability of the political regime (Q16). The analysis indicates that there is a positive correlation, because the p-value of Gamma Coefficient is below the level of significance $\alpha = 0.05$.

p-value of Gamma Coefficient	Gamma	Total		No		Yes		Q14 / Q16
		%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	
0.0206	0.256	100%	4	0%	0	100%	4	Strongly agree
		100%	3	33.3%	1	66.7%	2	Agree
		100%	10	0%	0	100%	10	Neutral
		100%	17	5.9%	1	88.2%	15	Don't agree
		100%	23	0%	0	91.3%	21	Strongly disagree

The former results could be further explained from the table below, where it is clear that there is no correlation between that the political system uses social services to gain citizens' satisfaction for the system and the feeling of satisfaction the citizens could gain from the provision of those services. The results indicate that the respondents see that the social services' aims are

mainly for combating poverty and achieving citizens’ security. Therefore, they couldn’t identify a clear connection between the political system’s goals and the social service programs’ goals.

p-value	Total		Strongly don't agree		Don't agree		Neutral		Agree		Strongly agree		Q17 Q15
	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	
0.309	100%	39	28.2%	11	30.8%	12	25.6%	10	12.8%	5	2.6%	1	Achieving citizen's security
0.056	100%	19	36.8%	7	5.3%	1	42.1%	8	10.5%	2	5.3%	1	Combating poverty
0.580	100%	47	36.2%	17	25.5%	12	23.4%	11	12.8%	6	2.1%	1	Citizen feels the state cares for him
0.698	100%	38	36.8%	14	28.9%	11	21.1%	8	7.9%	3	5.3%	2	Citizen feels he gets a return for paying taxes
0.320	100%	27	33.3%	9	18.5%	5	25.9%	7	18.5%	5	3.7%	1	Achieving equality between citizen

The former answers do not correlate with the answers of the respondents regarding that the political regime uses social services to consolidate its legitimacy, which means citizens’ satisfaction with the political regime. 91.2% of the respondents agreed with this statement. This could be explained that the respondents differentiate between the regime’s stability and the regime’s legitimacy, because the political regime from 2013-2023 has employed social services for a specific purpose such as elections but not for long term aims such as achieving political stability and a welfare state.




Figure (9): distribution of the respondents according to whether there is a relationship between the provision of social services and citizens’ satisfaction with the political regime.

Though the respondents indicated previously that social services lead to achieving social justice, the table below indicates that achieving social justice is not sufficient to make citizens feel that justice prevails in a society.

The Paradoxes of the Welfare State in Egypt: Constructing a Welfare State through Legitimacy

غادة علي موسى

The table below shows that there is no correlation between achieving social justice through the provision of social services and having a just society, where Q18 indicates if the Egyptian citizen feel justice after receiving social welfare services, and where Q13 indicates if the provision of social welfare services leads to social justice, because the p-value of Chi-Square Test is greater than the level of significance $\alpha = 0.05$.

p-value	Total		I don't know		No		Yes		Q18 Q13
	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	
0.150	100%	38	23.7%	9	26.3%	10	50%	19	Yes
	100%	12	33.3%	4	50%	6	16.7%	2	No
	100%	7	28.6%	2	57.1%	4	14.3%	1	I don't know

It is also clear from the table below that there is a correlation between the total spending on social services and achieving social justice. The respondents understand that the state should spend a percentage from the GDP on providing social services and this could vary between 25% as 57.9% of the respondents indicated and 30% as 26.3% of the respondents indicated. This could help in achieving social justice.

p-value	Total		50% of GDP		25% of GDP		30% of GDP		Q14 Q13
	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	
0.360	100%	38	15.8%	6	57.9%	22	26.3%	10	Yes
	100%	12	0%	0	83.3%	10	16.7%	2	No

The respondents' answers indicated also that the stability of the political regime could be attained through means other than social services. From the table below, it is clear that there is no correlation between the respondents' evaluation of the performance of the government in providing social services (Q21) and achieving the stability of the political system through the provision of those services (Q16), because the p-value values of Gamma Coefficient are greater than the level of significance $\alpha = 0.05$

p-value	المجموع		Strongly don't agree		Don't agree		Neutral		Agree		Strongly agree		Q16 Q21
	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	
0.171	100%	27	40.7%	11	33.3%	9	14.8%	4	0%	0	11.1%	3	Not efficient
	100%	26	30.8%	8	30.8%	8	23.1%	6	11.5%	3	3.8%	1	Less efficient

Concerning improving the provision of social services, 89.5% of the respondents answered that there is a need for more policies to improve the provision of social services such as increasing the target groups (68.5%) and more regulations (63%). In the same context 47.4% of the respondents rated the government performance of providing social services as not efficient, and 45.6% think it is less efficient.




Figure (10): distribution of the respondents according to the policies needed to improve the provision of social services.

Figure (110) shows that 47.4% of the respondents think that the government performance in providing social services is not efficient and 45.6% think it is less efficient, which indicates that there is an overall dissatisfaction with the government performance in that regard.




Figure (11): distribution of the respondents according to how they evaluate the government's performance in providing social services

In figure (12), the answers reveal also the existence of no correlation between the respondents' opinion about the government performance in providing social services (Q21) and if social services are one of the tools that the political regime uses to gain citizens' satisfaction (Q17). This could be

The Paradoxes of the Welfare State in Egypt: Constructing a Welfare State through Legitimacy

غادة علي موسى

explained that the political regime concentrates on other services to gain citizens' satisfaction rather than providing social services.

p-value	Gamma	Total		Strongly don't agree		Don't agree		Neutral		Agree		Strongly agree		Q17 Q21
		النسبة Frequency	%	النسبة Frequency	%	النسبة Frequency	%	النسبة Frequency	%	النسبة Frequency	%	النسبة Frequency	%	
0.28	0.035	100%	27	44.4%	12	25.9%	7	18.5%	5	3.7%	1	7.4%	2	Not efficient
		100%	26	26.9%	7	30.8%	8	23.1%	6	19.2%	5	0%	0	Less efficient

Conclusion

The research paper discussed the welfare systems in Egypt across various dimensions of the understanding of the role of the welfare state, the history of welfare policies in different political contexts in Egypt and through the opinions of 57 policy and decision makers in Egypt.

In 2014 Egyptian citizens called for the state and its local authorities to play an active role in issuing regulations and controlling the market, which were not adequately addressed. The state failed in alleviating poverty (bread) and was not able to ensure a minimal level of life quality (social justice) and faced difficulties in implementing the classical tradeoff between (liberty) and economic needs. Instead, Egypt has introduced social policies that have concealed the development of a true welfare state by using social program coverage as a measure of welfare state expansion. The implemented social policies in Egypt reflect an understanding that the market is at odds with the welfare state or its ingrained social policies.

The research paper has demonstrated that Egypt does not have a clear welfare philosophy. What exists is a quasy welfare state, or in other words a non- mature welfare state. The research concluded that the Egyptian government's social policies and welfare approaches are still beset by a number of issues, including weak democratic practices and non-inclusiveness. Also, social policy could be regarded occasionally as a political matter but is mainly perceived as a fiscal and to a lesser extent a social issue.

What de- legitimized the welfare state in Egypt is not the social provisions in itself, but the driving forces of the necessity of providing social services for the needy as a result of economic liberalization policies. The type of legitimacy that the government was interested in was what Johnson and Dowd termed it as "social legitimacy". This type of

legitimization could involve encouraging individuals to accept particular social policies and practices, that help in legitimizing the status quo.

Thus, the type of the welfare state in Egypt is a “crises- driven welfare state.

In spite of the expansion in social spending and in the provision of social services in Egypt, the existence and the nature of the welfare state is not clear. These social services have disabled the development of a true welfare state in Egypt. The state has used social programs and initiatives only to stabilize its political regime, because the state has previously been unable to preserve its efficiency and get over the paradoxes of capitalism since the “Infitah” policies in the 70s of the 20th centuries. This is evident in the inadequate results of social policy reforms such as the increase in poverty rates and those persons who receive social services have been harmed more than having benefited from it.

Though the former results and discontent with the social policies outcomes, this did not de-legitimize Sisi’s political regime until now, because the rentier seeking actors are the poor and businesses from military backgrounds who benefit from these policies despite its inefficiency. Therefore, there is little empirical evidence of a strong relationship between legitimacy and the expansion of social policies in Egypt after 2014. However, assuming that the poor will always support the political regime, because of their dependency on social services from the state is not guaranteed, due to fiscal policy constraints, which may de-legitimize the whole political regime in the future.

My argument is that the structural changes Egypt had to endure before and after 2011, and financial instability and economic hardship could threaten the sustainability of even providing social services, thus threatens the political regime’s stability. The state also relies on non- governmental organizations and businesses to finance or provide social packages, which constitute another threat to its legitimacy. When facing citizens’ political or economic discontent, the state re-constructs or intensifies a package of social policies in order to bolster its legitimacy, even if it is in the absence of public demand or expectations.

The state initiatives and programs until 2023 serve to locate Egypt’s social policies away from a real welfare state. A welfare state is currently not affordable in Egypt. Egypt will not be able to evolve into a welfare state

unless within a democratic system and a reconciliation with the role of the market in the constitution of a welfare state.

The expansion of social policies and initiatives is not sufficient evidence for the existence of a welfare state in Egypt. Social policies have to be an outcome of social bargaining, and an interplay between the policies executed at the state level and the social policies developed by political and social actors, and not only driven by the political regime and security apparatus demands and initiatives.

Social policies could demand their own legitimacy only through political democratization and could not by its own strengthen state legitimacy.

Egypt needs a new welfare settlement and arrangements that takes the social significance of the program, the logic of funding and the resources, and the project governance mainly the coordination mechanisms between the different policy makers into account. Social risks should also be considered as well as obligatory reciprocity and embedding a culture of active citizenship and membership in policy making and the reconciliation of conflicting interests of legitimacy.

The welfare discourse and policies in Egypt still fail to account for the former, and two key aspects of liberalism have been neglected through various steps: first, that the regime seeks to replace liberalism with a form of “achieved” welfare state. Second, the assumed efforts of the regime to equalize individual opportunities by strengthening the role of the state to provide some basic social and economic supports to individuals in need to guarantee the regime’s stability.

The research paper suggests fundamental transformations that must occur in social welfare programs and services in Egypt. Wolfe and Klausen (2000) developed in the 40s of the 20th century a corresponding social philosophy and was regarded as a democratic practice that rested on citizenship and solidarity, which played a significant role in the development of the traditional welfare state. The resources needed for this philosophy came about as a result of the capitalist production system. (Pratt, Alan, 2006)

Another transformation that needs to take place in social welfare programs and services in Egypt is shifting the concept of social care from a temporary or reserve job to a fixed and a developmental job. There is also a need to shift from the concept of charity to the basic rights of the citizen, to

shift from the lower limit to the upper limit and from individual to social reform, and from caring for the poor to a welfare state for all.

The efficacy of a welfare state in Egypt is still threatened by neo liberals' rejection of a mixed economy or a compromise between different types of capitalists and socialists -still held ideas.

It cannot be concluded that the increasing amounts of social expenditure post 2014 could be interpreted as a commitment to welfarism. Programs for structural reform have made this clear by influencing exchange rates, which in turn has affected the cost of goods and services. Despite the claims of succeeding governments that wage increases promote social justice, real wages did not rise along with nominal wages.

The "Cost Push" phenomenon, in which the growth rate of cash income outpaces the growth rate of producing goods and services (Egle, Walter P.,1961:220, Ibrahim, Ahmed Hassan, 2013) resulted in retrenchment policies, which could endanger the existing poor -type of welfare state.

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